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On July 6, 1939, Eastern Airlines began scheduled air mail
service between two points using a rotary -wing type aircraft. This
experiment which lasted approximately one year flew mail from the Camden
Airport in New Jersey across the Delaware River to the rooftop of the
Philadelphia Post Office. The aircraft was a Kellett KD-1B autogyro.
It was not a pure rotary -wing craft as we know today's helicopters to
be. It differed in that instead of achieving both lift and forward
propulsion from the overhead rotor, the autogyro received its lift from
the rotor while forward flight was provided solely by a propeller mounted
forward on the fuselage revolving in a vertical plane. Nevertheless,
this service became the first scheduled ssrvice utilizing rotary -wing
aircraft.
On April 15, 1941, Igor Sikorsky flew the first officially
recorded rotor helicopter flight in the United States. The one hour and
fifteen second experimental flight took place at Stratford, Connecticut
(now the home of United Aircraft's Sikorsky Aircraft Division) in a
p
Vought -Sikorsky VS-300A. This aircraft was a pure helicopter. Although
R. E. G. Davies, A History of the World's Airlines (London:
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 473.
%J.S., Civil Aeronautics Board (hereafter to be abbreviated CAB),
"Milestones," Handbook of Airline Statistics 1969 (V/ashington, D.C.:




underpowered compared to today's helicopter, it featured the familiar
single main rotor overhead to provide lift, forvard flight, and
directional control; and a smaller tail rotor at the after end of the
craft to counteract the main rotor's torque.
Both of these historical events made the public aware of the
unique possibilities of commercial helicopter passenger service.
However, further experimentation and the priorities of World War II
delayed implementation of this new facet of air transportation.
The termination of the war brought many changes over the pre-war
style of living. Among these changes were the technological developments
of the aircraft industry that allowed safe, comfortable, and fast long-
distance air travel. In addition to this change, the large production
facilities that were used to build trucks and tanks were easily converted
to the production of automobiles. And, finally, the pent-up consumer
demand, stimulated by increased disposable income and liberal credit
policies, resulted in the tremendous expansion of both of these indus-
tries. But the growth of these transportation segments soon resulted
in a problem that set the stage for the birth of commercial helicopter
passenger service.
It was noticed as early as 1949 that one of the most serious
deterrents to air transportation was the time consuming surface travel
between an airline passenger's origin and/or destination and the air-
port. This was caused by the lack of convenient public transportation
systems and the crowded conditions on the highways. Neither problem
could be readily solved. To expedite the traffic flow between these
*-Welch L. Pogue, "Helicopter's Air Power Role Misunderstood,"
Aviation Week , February 28, 1949, p. 22.
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three points, air transportation seemed to be the only alternative, but
obviously conventional fixed-wing aircraft could not be utilized on the
downtown to outlying airport segment. And airport traffic area delays
on certain short -distance airport to airport segments would cancel out
the fixed -wing aircraft's speed.
The helicopter, although relatively slow and limited in carrying
capacity and range when compared to conventional aircraft, had the one
key advantage over fixed -wing aircraft that suited it for intra -city and
airport flights—the ability to take off and land vertically, thus allow-
ing flight operations from small, confined areas such as downtown heli-
ports atop buildings and on small plots at ground level. Its relatively
slow speed would be compensated for by its direct access and its own
flight pattern in airport traffic areas that would free it from traffic
control delays.
With the helicopter's potential realized, the Civil Aeronautics
Board—the economic regulator of the air transportation industry—began
authorizing commercial helicopter passenger service in large, densely
populated metropolitan areas of the country. The Board granted the
Yellow Cab Company a three-year permit in 1947 to operate two routes:
between the Cleveland Municipal Airport and a terminal point in downtown
Cleveland, and between the airport and the suburb of Euclid, Ohio. This
experiment in intra -city helicopter service was to utilize Sikorsky S-51
helicopters2 and was authorized to carry only passengers and property. 3
•^Charles Gablehouse, Helicopters and Autogiros (New York: J. B.
Lippincott Company, 1967), pp. 183-84.
See Appendix for aircraft descriptions and specifications.
•7
uCharles Adams, "Great Lakes Area Granted Helicopter Feeder
Services," Aviation Week , September 15, 1947, p. 49.
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However, the CAB eventually revoked the Yellow Cab certificate because
of that company's failure to use it. This was caused by the lack of a
suitable helicopter to perform passenger service, and the absence of a
mail authorization from the CAB that made it difficult to attract
o
financing to launch the service.
Another experiment in airport-city helicopter taxis was conducted
by Skyways Corporation in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1947. Using three
Sikorsky S-51 helicopters, the route was a three-mile flight from a down-
town rooftop building to Logan International Airport. This service was
discontinued because of an inability to achieve a profitable load factor
--a problem that was to plague commercial helicopter service operators
for some time to come.
The first sustained commercial helicopter service was provided
by a firm called Los Angeles Airways (LAA) . Founded by a group of
businessmen on May 11, 1944, the Civil Aeronautics Board granted the
company a three-year temporary certificate on May 23, 1947, to carry
mail and cargo. LAA became the first regularly scheduled helicopter
service when it began operation on October 1, 1947. Passenger service
was begun on July 5, 1951, making LAA the first regularly scheduled
helicopter airline.
^"LAA Readies Passenger Copter Service," Aviation Week , July 23,
1951, p. 56.
2Selig Altschul, "CAB Faces Helicopter Problem," Aviation Week ,
January 9, 1950, p. 35.
3




5CAB, "Major CAB Actions," Handbook 196 9, p. 462.
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Sinoe that time three more large scale helicopter airlines were
formed—New York Airways (NYA) , Chicago Helicopter Airways (CHA), and San
Francisco -Oakland Helicopter Airlines (SFO) . Los Angeles Airways, plus
these three, established the standard in commercial helicopter passenger
service. Therefore, it was the responsibility of these four companies
to prove that helicopters could provide convenient and economically
sound service in the intra -city and city-to-airport markets.
Statement of the Research Question
The main research question of this thesis is "How have the four
certified operational commercial helicopter passenger companies performed
since their founding?
The subsidiary questions leading to the answer of the main
research question are:
1. How have the four helicopter companies developed since their
inception?
2. What has been the economic performance of the companies,
individually and as a group?.
3. What role has the Civil Aeronautics Board played in scheduled
commercial helicopter service?
4. What role have the commercial airlines played in scheduled
commercial helicopter service?
Scope of the Study
This study will briefly describe the evolution of helicopter
transportation from its beginning until 1970, with a focus on the four
major helicopter airlines: Los Angeles Airways, New York Airways,
Chicago Helicopter Airways, and San Francisco -Oakland Helicopter
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Airlines. The descriptions will emphasize the chronological highlights
in each airline's development rather than the details of operation. In
addition, pertinent information such as routes, types of aircraft
utilized, fares, and heliport availability will be included. This over-
view will give the reader some idea of the makeup of helicopter operations.
The economics of this portion of the transportation system are
limited to those aspects of helicopter operations that will provide
sufficient information for the reader to evaluate the helicopter's
performance. Again, details felt to be interesting but not essential to
understanding have been eliminated.
Two of the most influential segments of the federal government in
the development of the commercial helicopter airlines have been the Civil
Aeronautics Board and the Congress. Consequently, discussion will be
restricted to these two segments. However, mention of other departments
of the government, such as the military, will be noted when applicable.
Method of Analysis and the Research
Methods Utilised
It will be noted in the next section of this chapter that the
subsidiary questions have been arranged in an order that will facilitate
the answering of the main research question. Each chapter is a reflection
of a subsidiary question. Each subsidiary question will provide more
information upon which a valid conclusion can be stated in the end.
Information for this study was obtained from secondary sources
using 5x8 cards. Reproduced copies of the source were used when the
needed data was so voluminous that copying by hand v/ould have been
impractical. Primary sources were utilized initially, but it was soon
discovered that information being given by those sources was identical
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to that found in the secondary sources. In that light, it was felt that
time and energy could be saved without any loss of validity by forgoing
interviews and correspondence.
The locations of these secondary sources were the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board (CAB), the Naval Air Systems Command of the Department of the
Navy, the District of Columbia and the Fairfax County libraries. The
first two libraries just mentioned were of primary importance. The CAB
provided the statistical data pertaining to the four companies 1 operations
while the Naval Air Systems Command library provided information on their
history through periodicals dated back to the commencement of operations.
The specific sources of information were government publications,
periodicals, books relating to air transportation, and trade publications.
Organization of the Study
Chapter Two will provide an historical perspective of the heli-
copter manufacturing industry and the four helicopter operators. It
will trace the development of each from the beginning to the present.
Highlights and significant aspects in their growth will be noted, along
with a description of the airline in terms of route structure, fares,
heliports, and the type of helicopters utilized.
Chapter Three will examine the techniques that are used in
evaluating the economic performance of an airline. In that discussion,
salient points concerning helicopter operations will be brought out and
a comparison among the operators' performance will be made.
Chapter Four will be concerned with the role that the Civil




Chapter Six will establish pertinent conclusions based on






It is essential that some discussion of commercial helicopter
passenger service be first devoted to the helicopter manufacturing
industry. By doing so, a better understanding of some of the diffi-
culties encountered by this unique service will be provided.
As has been the case in most aviation developments, the pressures
of hot and cold wars stimulated all aspects of helicopter progress.
World War II prompted further experimentation in vertical take-off and
landing aircraft following Igor Sikorsky's VS-300 flight in 1941.
Another pioneer in this field, Frank Piasccki, later built and flew the
second successful United States helicopter in 1943, although his air-
craft did not participate in the war. Only three helicopter types were
ordered in quantity during the war, and all were built by Sikorsky.
They were 130 R-4's, sixty -five R-5's, and 200 R-6's. 2 These aircraft
were very much like the original VS-300 except that the cockpit was
enclosed and space was provided for two passengers. The Army, Navy, and
Coast Guard restricted these models to light emergency transport and
Philip Siekman, "The Big New Whirl in Helicopters," Fortune
,
April, 1966, p. 127.
PAlexander McSurely, "Helicopter Industry Gets First Big




rescue, because of their small size and limited lifting capacity due to
their underpowered reciprocating engines. On January 3, 1944, the first
helicopter mission of mercy vas performed by a Coast Guard R-4. This
helicopter carried blood plasma from New York City to the destroyer
USS Turner, which had suffered an explosion off of Sand Hook, New Jersey,
incurring over 100 casualties. The first combat aircrew helicopter
rescue took place in Burma in April, 1944. An Army R-4 lifted three
injured liaison airplane aircrewmen from the jungle behind enemy lines.
The state of technological development of the helicopter at this time is
revealed when you consider that this R-4 v/as required to make three trips
to rescue each crewman. This vas necessitated by the high altitude and
high temperatures aggravating an already limited "power-available"
engine.
With the advent of atomic weapons , the military realized the
danger of massing their military forces in a central location. In the
future, tactical forces would have to be dispersed to prevent total
annihilation by a single weapon. The dispersion, however, prompted the
requirement of increased mobility--a requirement that the Marine Corps
found could be met by the helicopter. In 1947 they established the first
experimental helicopter squadron to test the new combat technique of
vertical assaults to complement their World War II -proven amphibious
assaults.^ Encouraged by this development and by Air Force requirements
Ben S. Lee, ed. , 1959 Aviation Facts and Figures , Aviation
Industries Association of America, Inc. (Washington, D.C.: Lincoln
Press, Inc. , 1959)
,
p. 79.
^"Famous Firsts," 1970 Sikorsky Aircraft Calendar .
3Ibid .
^Lee, 1959 Aviation Facts and Figures , p. 79.

-11-
for rescue aircraft, the helicopter manufacturing industry produced 387
aircraft to meet the military's needs from 1946 to 1950.
But for all the technological developments of the helicopter in
the postwar period, the rotorcraft v/as still considered more of a
"... potential force than a present factor ..." and ". . .at the
present stage of evolution the helicopter had now reached essentially
the same point of development which fixed-wing aircraft had reached at
the outbreak of World War I . . .
"
2 The problems of greater load
carrying capacity, longer range, and improved performance were still
troubling its progress; and the price of a helicopter was rising,
rather than falling, due to increasing design complexity, and labor and
material costs. And this v/as in spite of growing military procurement
and commercial sales.
Commercial sales of helicopters following the war consisted of
only small types, usually a converted military model, seating from two
to five persons. These models were about the size of Sikorsky's S-51
which became the first helicopter to be licensed by the Civil Aeronautics
Board for commercial operations. The S-51 entered production in 1946.
In the postwar period from 1946 to 1950, the great majority of these
aircraft in the commercial field were being used for agricultural
Gerald J. McAllister , ed. , 1970 Aerospace Facts and Figures ,
Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc. (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 34.
p
Albert E. Smyser, "Helicopter's Air Power Implications,"
Aviation Week , February 23, 1948, p. 39.
Robert McLarren, "Helicopter Progress is Revealed," Aviation
Week
, May 3, 1948, p. 13.
^Leonard Bridgman, ed., Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1949-
1950 (New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1949), p. 277c.
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purposes such as crop dusting and spraying for disease control, aerial
and geological surveying, mapping, pov/er line patrols, off-shore drilling
service, prospecting, rescue, and police purposes. The commercial
flying of passengers on a scheduled basis was authorized during this
period for some carriers, but the CAB withheld such authority for LAA,
CHA, and NYA because of the experimental nature of rotary -wing aircraft,
and the very limited carrying capacity. But mail service on a regular
pattern was begun.
It wasn't long, therefore, before commercial operators began
demanding larger vertical-lift aircraft to carry larger loads of mail
and cargo,- and passengers to increase their revenue. The three giants
of the helicopter production industry at that time --Bell, Piasecki, and
Sikorsky—announced their willingness to provide commercial versions of
their craft, which were military oriented. Only Piasecki had a model
large enough to carry ten passengers, but this was not available to
commercial operators. However, the limiting factor in the development
of these larger commercial versions were the armed forces, whose per-
mission to produce such aircraft was necessary beforehand. In addition,
some aviation experts thought that the chances were slim that any of
the manufacturers could stand the costly tooling expense unless they
received substantial orders for the large models from the military to
overshadow the price penalty caused by low production. 3
Pogue, "Helicopter's Role Misunderstood," p. 22.
Smyser, "Helicopter's Implications," p. 39.
3Stanley L. Colbert, "Transport Helicopters Revealed," Aviation
Week, November 7, 1949, p. 42.
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The Korean War provided those substantial orders needed to
employ the economies of scale in helicopter production. The years 1951
and 1952 found a respective total of 360 and 983 helicopters produced
for the military—a combined total that exceeded the number of units
produced from 1941 to 1950 by sixty percent! 1 The vast majority of
commercial operators did not benefit immediately from this expanded
production. The war's demands for rotary-wing aircraft limited the
supply end postponed the acquisition of the newer and larger helicopter
cargo versions. However, those commercial helicopter airlines operating
on a schedule were authorized by the military to purchase a few of these
new, larger capacity helicopters. This was prompted by the manufacturers*
and military's need for operational data on its helicopters. Paradox-
ically, even though the military was the ".largest user of helicopters,
their low utilization rate at that time forced a dependence on the
helicopter airlines for such information because their utilization rate
was high. For example, in 1962, the military was fortunate if they
utilized their helicopters an average of vhree hours per day v/hile
Chicago Helicopter Airways was using their equipment ten hours per day
on the average.
Sikorsky's S-55, a seven-passenger commercial version of the
military's H-19, was the airline's answer to the replacement of the
S-51. Developed during the Korean War, the S-55 was first used in
airline traffic by New York Airways on October 15, 1952, to carry mail
McAllister, 1970 Aerospace Facts and Figures
, p. 34.
McSurely, "First Big Orders," Aviation Week
, pp. 12-13.
David A. Anderton, "Military Sparks Helicopter Growth Revival,"
Aviation Week
,
March 12, 1962, pp. 247-48.
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initially, and then passengers the following summer. The S-55 became
the first helicopter approved for commercial passenger operations. *-
The termination of the Korean War found helicopter development
at the 1920 stage of fixed-wing aircraft configuration. After eight
years of commercial operations, complaints of high costs of purchase
and operation were voiced. The American Helicopter Society urged that
an " . . . engineer designing a transport helicopter should not be
content with just producing a machine of the best possible speed or
payload or range; but, instead, one that is capable of getting the
z
highest possible profit for the commercial operator." Operators
expressed the feeling that the helicopter industry had failed to work
on the basic problems of the lack of large transport -type vehicles, the
complexity and attendant high initial and operating costs, and the lack
of all-weather capability. They felt thao the major problem of that
industry to meet the demand for efficient and economical machines was
due to the multiplicity of projects and development loads it had
accumulated under government contracts for the military. The Air
Transport Association demanded that the industry design a helicopter
specifically for airline use, rather than a military-oriented design. 5
•'CAB, "New Aircraft Types," Handbook 1969 , p. 488.
p
Irving Stone, "Military Copter Success Spurs Civil Use,"
Aviation Week , March 15, 1954, p. 143.
3Claude 0. Witze, "Helicopter Builders Grapple With Costs,"
Aviation Week , July 5, 1954, p. 13.
^"Volume of Complaints Measures Need for Helicopters," Aviation
Week
, February 25, 1957, p. 262.
Clc-ude 0. Witze , "Airlines Demand 'Practical* Helicopters,"
Aviation Week , September 3, 1956, p. 39.
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Another often-voiced demand was that multi-engine aircraft be
produced. • It was realized early by the commercial helicopter airline
operators that if safe flight operations in the center of congested
metropolitan areas were to be initiated, more than one engine would be
required. The unique ability of a helicopter to autorotate or make a
controlled, unpowered glide to a landing would be precluded by high
buildings, traffic and pedestrians. The only alternative would be the
addition of another engine to back up a failed engine so that a stricken
craft could continue powered flight.
To meet these demands in some part, efforts to adapt the long-
p
established gas turbine to helicopters were begun in 1954. The major
advantages to be realized in this adaptation were:
1. Increased power.
2. Increased fuel economy.
3. Increased durability.
4. Increased reliability.
5. Lower noise level.
6. Reduced vibration level.
3
7. Reduced maintenance costs.
The Sikorsky S-58 and the Boeing-Vertol (formerly known as
Piasecki) V-44 helicopters were put into service in 1956 and 1958,
•'•"Backs Copters for Inter-city Hauls," Aviation Week , May 8,
1950, p. 43.
^h. J. Nutall, "Gas Turbine Improves Performance," Aviation
Week, June 27, 1955, pp. 28-33.
3




respectively, to provide more carrying capacity.-1- Both aircraft were
considered interim models for commercial operators because of their
p
single -engine limitation. The primary goal was acquisition of
Sikorsky's and Vertol's planned twin-engine turbine models. Without
the increased power of the turbine -powered craft, problems such as
experienced with New York Airways' V-44 would continue. Such a large
aircraft powered by a reciprocating engine was suitable in ideal weather
conditions, but was handicapped by high humidity and high temperatures.
Such atmospheric conditions required that passenger loads be cut from
fifteen to eleven, thus reducing revenues per trip and increasing costs
because of. the unscheduled trips to transport those passengers originally
left behind. In addition, the single engine limitation still was
hampering instrument flight at night and in inclement weather.
1960 marked the transition year from piston -powered to turbine-
powered helicopters. The industry suffered decreased sales in 1959
because of the commercial operators' anticipation of this transition,
and the contraction of government spending for military weapons.
Despite the growing number of commercial helicopters and helicopter
operators, military development funds and production quantities still
^AB, "New Aircraft," Handbook 1969
. p. 488.
"Helicopter Design Lags Behind Needs," Aviation Week , March 12,
1956, pp. 258-65; Glenn Garrison, "NY Airways Studies Turbine
Conversion," Aviation Week , December 8, 1958, p. 47.
3Garrison, "NY Airways Studies," p. 47.
4Ibid .
^Robert I. Stanfield, "Helicopter Market Meets Transition Lull,"
Aviation Week
, March 9, 1959, p. 231.
^McAllister, 1970 Aerospace Facts and Figures , p. 125.
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govemed conrnercial helicopter development. *• In addition, the military
tendency at this time was to reduce the variety of helicopters in their
inventory, thus decreasing the commercial operator 1 s chances of
eventually finding a craft to suit their specific purposes.
Sikorsky brought out the first turbine -powered helicopter in
1960. Called the S-62, it was a single -engine , eight to eleven passenger
model designed as an interim aircraft until the twin-engine turbine S-61
by Sikorsky was ready for marketing. Los Angeles Airways utilized the
S-62 as a familiarization vehicle for its pilots while simultaneously
evaluating passenger service operations. 3
In quick succession, the Sikorsky S-61 was placed into commercial
helicopter airline service in March, 1962, and Boeing -Vertol's twin-
engine, tandem rotor helicopter, the V-10", went operational in July,
51962. The commercial operator's solution to rising operational costs
and the desire for increased safety had long-last been realized, it was
believed. It did not matter that these aircraft were outgrowths of the
Navy's famed antisubmarine warfare helicopter, the SH-3; or the Marines'
troop-carrying CH-46, respectively. The operators felt that their
business would be profitable from this time on, unaware that in the next
six years circumstances such as increased costs due to twin-turbine
Changing Concepts Set Helicopter Pace," Aviation Week
,
March 7, 1960, p. 247.
2
I_bid.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Helicopter Air
Service Program , Hearings before the Aviation Subcommittee, Senate,
89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 148.







introduction, subsidy curtailment, fatal accidents, and periodio
unprofitable trunk airline business would adversely affect that goal.
Initially buoyed by the turbine introduction, the helicopter
industry picked up more impetus from government contracts as a result
of the United States* involvement in Vietnam. Confronted by a guerilla
insurgency that required extreme mobility to counter, the only effective
weapon was the helicopter. At no other time in rotary-wing history were
the capabilities and limitations of the helicopter revealed and studied
more than in the Vietnam War. United States helicopter production grew
by approximately 800fo between 1960 and 1967, when deliveries from mid-
1965 orders for the Vietnam buildup peaked at about sixteen million
pounds (see Figure 2)
.
The commercial helicopter airline operators did not directly
benefit by this increased production. Those carriers utilizing the S-61
did not benefit because that model aircraft was not used in combat. New
York Airways* V-107 did have a counterpart in Vietnam in the Marines*
CH-46, but many of the bugs in the aircraft were resolved by that airline
prior to the Marines using it in Vietnam. However, the increased
production did provide increased earnings to the helicopter industry to
undertake limited research and development in future machines and to
spread the cost of producing commercial airline helicopters.
Today, the helicopter industry is on perilous ground. All the
helicopters presently in service with the military and the commercial
Ben Schemmer, "Helicopter Industry Faces Potentially Fatal
Squeeze," Armed Forces Journal , June 13, 1970, p. 14.





operators were developed prior to 1965. But since that year, the
industry's engineering capability has been supported by a single
military Research and Development program—the Lockheed/Army AH-56
"Cheyenne" (see Figure 1). For over five years, therefore, technical
developments in the industry as a whole have been dependent on production
or product improvement contracts, which nov; are heading for a ten-year
low (see Figure 2). Because of the steady withdrawals from Vietnam,
Defense Department production and research cutbacks have placed the
helicopter industry in a unique position. Current production runs will
soon cease and future production of newly designed helicopters are
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Fig. 1. --Helicopter Development
Source: Ben Schemmer, "Helicopter Industry Faces Potentially
Fatal Squeeze," Armed Forces Journal , June 13, 1970,
p. 14.
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The Armed Forces Journal states the implications of this
situation:
1. There isn't enough production business in sight to let
firms like Boeing -Vertol, Bell, Kaman, Sikorsky, and Hughes Tool
Company to keep their helicopter design teams intact through
production-funded improvement, or independent research and
development programs.
2. Nor do the firms have the business base needed to v/eather
with company funds the drought which faces them in research and
development funding.
3. Given currently planned Department of Defense helicopter
orders, it's unlikely that enough helicopter firms v/ill survive
for Department of Defense to have meaningful competition on its
downstream programs.
4. Commercial utilization hasn't expanded enough to provide
a production base adequate for the industry to survive, much less
develop its ideas for efficient second-generation turbine
equipment.^-
Tablt: 1 gives an indication of the total number of helicopters
produced by the industry since 1953. In addition, the relationship
between commercial and military production is shown. This clearly shows
that the military dominates the market. Out of the total of 19,029
helicopters produced from 1953 to 1967, 13,796 or seventy -three percent
were purchased by the military.
Table 2 reveals the percentage of helicopter airline aircraft
produced from the total number of commercial helicopters. It is
apparent that there was not a substantial market for airline -type
helicopters (except for four years in the 1950 's) that warranted the
industry to design an aircraft specifically for airline use. A bigger
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The commercial helicopter category is composed of all
helicopters used for public transportation, business, and utility.
"» c »Not available. However, Department of Defense funded
production of 2,685 helicopters in Fiscal Year 1968; 2,304 in Fiscal Year
1969; 1,225 in Fiscal Year 1970; and 1,009 in Fiscal Year 1971. (See
Schemmer, "Helicopter Industry Squeeze," Armed Forces Journal , p. 14.)
Sources: Lee, ed., 1959 Aviation Facts and Figures , p. 106;




PRODUCTION OF AIRLINE HELICOPTERS AS A PERCENTAGE OF
COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION CALENDAR YEARS 1953 to 1969




















































aThe airline category includes only those helicopters capable of
providing mass public transportation. These ere: the Boeing-Vertol V-44
and V-107, and the Sikorsky S-55, S-58, S-62, and S-61.
The commercial category is composed of all helicopters used for
public transportation, business, and utility.
Sources: Lee, ed., 1959 Aviation Facts and Figures , p. 106;
McAllister, ed. , 1970 Aerospace Facts and Figures , p. 35.
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type helicopters that were small, light, and relatively inexpensive to
purchase.
The helicopter manufacturing industry clearly lacked the
incentive to become fully committed to the production of large com-
mercial helicopters. The armed forces v/ere the biggest buyers of
helicopters as was pointed out in the preceding discussion, and,
naturally, it followed that the industry catered to the military's
needs. It was estimated that from 1943 to 1963 ninety percent of the
dollar volume of the helicopter manufacturing industry was attributed
p
to military purchases, and judging from Table 1 this figure has
probably remained oonstant if not increased.
Consaquently , the helicopter airlines were dependent on
commercial versions of military helicopters throughout their history.
The initial enthusiasm of commercial helicopter service following World
War II was dampened by the lack of suitable equipment and the military
requirements of the Korean War. The helioopter airlines compiled
operational data on the use of military helicopters during the Korean
War, and they discovered that the costs were high.
In the following section on the helicopter airline industry, it
will be noted that only five helicopter airline companies were certified
by the GAB. By the mid-1950' s the realization that economic helicopter
operations would not materialize until the equipment could be improved
upon prompted the CAB to withhold further expansion of the helicopter
^David A. Brown, "Helicopters Showing Strong Rise in Corporate
Sales," Aviation Week , March 6, 1967, p. 306.
^Gerald J. McAllister, ed., 1963 Aerospace Facts and Figures ,
Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc. (Los Angeles: Aero
Publishers, Inc., 1963), p. 141.
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service experiment. The basic reason for this restriction was the
increasing annual federal subsidy that was required to support the
three helicopter airlines. It will be shown in Chapter Four that
pressure for reduction of the subsidy was being applied by the Congress.
Again, clearly, the helicopter manufacturing industry found
that a large civilian commercial helicopter market did not warrant the
time and expense required to develop an aircraft to meet that sector's
needs. Practical economics dictated that the manufacturing industry
fulfill the requirements of its largest customer and steer away from a
market that consisted of four operational commercial carriers.
The Airlines
Since 1947, five commercial helicopter airline operators have
been certificated by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to provide mail,
cargo, and passenger service in four metropolitan areas. These airlines
v/ere Los Angeles Airways, Chicago Helicopter Airways, New York Airv/ays,
San Francisco -Oakland Airlines, and Washington Airways. The first four
companies will be discussed according to the date of their origination.
Information on the route structure, sample fares at a selected time in
their history, availability of heliports, and the type of helicopters
utilized since certification are provided to give the reader a perspec-
tive of helicopter airline operations.
Washington Airways, as of this writing, has not yet inaugurated
service, and there is some question whether it will. Because of this
peculiar situation, this carrier's historical development will be
presented last.
^"Washington Helicopter Network to be Studied," Aviation Week ,
December 19, 1960, p. 29.
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Los Angeles Airways (LAA)
LAA was the pioneer of scheduled commercial helicopter airline
service. Formed by a group of businessmen led by Clarence M. Belinn,
the company filed for a certificate of convenience and necessity for six
feeder routes in the Los Angeles area on May 20, 1944. The CAB denied
that initial request.
On March 26, 1945, LAA filed a second time, requesting authority
to service four routes. Portions of the request were approved by the
CAB, and a three year temporary certificate was granted on May 22,
p
1947. In essence, the certificate authorized the carriage of mail and
cargo--no passengers—over a system that connected the Los Angeles Post
Office terminal annex building downtown with thirty selected suburban
post offices within a fifty -mile radius of the terminal. This system
was officially designated Route 84 by the CAB. Flight operations com-
menced on October 1, 1947. The award was predicated primarily on the
basis of time that would be saved by employing helicopters vice surface
transportation between the post offices and the airport. Provisions
were made in the award for changes in the initial flight pattern without
LAA having to resort to formal proceedings with the CAB.
With the experience acquired through this basic mail route, LAA
requested on May 17, 1949, that the CAB grant the authority to carry
"XJAB, Docket 1408, Order No. 420-401 (b) -1.
2CAB, Docket 1821, Order No. 420-401 (b) -2.
3U.S., CAB, "Milestones," Handbook 1969 , p. 435.
4Ibid
.
, "Major CAB Actions," p. 460.
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passengers. LAA did not originally seek authority to carry passengers
in 1947 because neither the helicopters they owned nor any helicopters
available on the market at that time were suitable for the scheduled
transportation of persons. But it was realized soon after commencement
of operations that mail and cargo would not sustain helicopter operations,
and that economic self-sufficiency would be realized only when passengers
would be authorized also.
On July 5, 1951, the CAB approved LAA's request for passenger
service, but contingent upon development of a passenger helicopter.
As in the case of LAA's mail certificate, avoidance of formal certifica-
tion proceedings was granted by the CAB when expeditious and frequent
modifications of the passenger route pattern were necessary. This
exemption to engage in passenger service under an area concept allowed
flexibility of operations in this crucial stage of commercial develop-
ment. Passenger service was inaugurated on November 22, 1954.
The granting of CAB's authorization for commercial passenger
service in 1951 unofficially designated LAA as the prime "guinea pig"
in helicopter operations. The federal civil aviation agencies focused
upon LAA when questions of helicopter "... route development, and
development of instrument flying, heliports and other prerequisites
"''CAB, Docket 3800, Order No. E-5506-7.
p
"LAA Plans Include Carrying Passengers," Aviation Week
,
June 6, 1949, pp. 49-50.
"LAA Readies Passenger Copter Service," pp. 55-56.
4CAB, "Major CAB Actions," Handbook 1969 , p. 462.








L&A's route configuration was patterned to conform with the
topography of southern California. The metropolitan area which consists
of cities as large as ". . . Baltimore, Charlotte, N.C., Miami,
Pittsburgh, Boston, Cleveland, Oklahoma City, Newark, Little Rock,
Seattle, and Washington . . ." is bounded on all sides by a topo-
graphical feature. To the west is the Pacific Ocean and to the east is
the Southern Sierra range of the Rocky Mountains. The north and south
are bounded by the foothills of the Sierras. In effect, LAA serves a
vast basin composed of four counties: Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside,
and San Bernardino—an area larger than the four states of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island combined.
Helicopter service allowed these huge communities access to the
Los Angeles International Airport--the one airport in the area capable
of handling all the trunk airlines. If this service was not provided,
each city would be required to have its own airport with the attendant
expense and the sacrificing of space if it wished aviation transporta-
tion.
At its zenith of service, the LAA system was divided into four
segments for schedule making and utilization purposes (see Figure 3).
Segments A and C were the shorter run routes to the Van Nuys and North
Hollywood area on the north and the Newport Beach area to the south.
Alexander McSurely, "Copter Firms Reveal Commercial Plans,"
Aviation Week
, November 12, 1951, pp. 13-14.
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Segment B was the run to San Bernardino to the east. This segment was
the longest stage length (e.g., distance between two points), which was
sixty -five miles. Segment A was the shortest, totaling approximately
twenty miles. The average passenger was carried more than forty miles.
^
Shuttle service to the Los Angeles main post office downtown was
3Segment S. The hub of LAA's system was the Los Angeles International
Airport which fed traffic to and from the area's large communities.
It was calculated in 1962 that ninety-four percent of LAA's passengers
were continuing airline passengers. The points served, mileages, and
fares, as of 1965, are shown in Table 3.
LAA's fare structure in 1963 was deliberately set to approximate
the most " . .. . acceptable form of competitive transportation ..."
The three basic forms of competition for LAA were the taxi, the limousine,
and the local airlines. This did not hold true in every case, but
generally it did. Surprisingly, LAA did not consider the private auto-
mobile as competition. The price of a ticket was based on a minimum
charge plus $1.00 for each ten miles from the International Airport. The
basic price was $4.00 and was called a handling charge. These ten-mile
segments were labeled by zones: 0-10 local zone, 10-20 city zone,
William H. Gregory, "Los Angeles Airways Expands with S-61's,"
Aviation Week , April 10, 1961, p. 42.
p
Hearings before the Senate Aviation Subcommittee, Helicopter
Program
, pp. 165-66.
Gregory, "Los Angeles Airways Expands," p. 42.
"S-61L Stimulates LAA Passenger Traffic," Aviation Week
,
August 27, 1962, p. 41.
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Source: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce,
Heli copter Air Service Program
, Hearings before the
Aviation Subcommittee, Senate, 89th Cong., 1st sess.,
1965, p. 148.
20-40 suburban zone, and 40-65 extended area zone.
With this fare arrangement, the typical price for the flight to
Disneyland from the airport was $7.00. San Bernardino was $10.00. The
cost of flight to Van Nuys, the shortest stage length, was $6.00.
From the inception of LAA's service in 1947, the airline's
desire for community heliports was met enthusiastically by the local
governments. Realizing the expense involved in acquiring their own
airports, these communities participated to the maximum extent in pro-
viding helicopter facilities. They provided an approximate two-acre
Gregory, "Los Angeles Airv/ays Expands," p. 45.
2Ibid. See also CAB, Docket 12869, Order No. 3-19283.
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parcel of land; would usually remove it from the tax rolls; and would
lease it to LAA on a long term basis. Typical examples of this
community accommodation are shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4







































Source: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce,
Helicopter Air Service Program
, Hearings before the
Aviation Subcommittee, Senate, 89th Cong., 1st sess.,
1965, pp. 145, 169.
The big disappointment of the LAA management was the inability
to establish a passenger heliport in downtown Los Angeles. Rooftop
landings were made atop the terminal post office building, but this was
restricted to mail flights. A number of factors were responsible for
this situation. By 1962 a number of heliports had been constructed
atop downtown buildings, but they were capable of handling only small,
light helicopters and not the large passenger carrying models. Parking
lot sites were considered, but then dropped because of the noise
problem, the loss of valuable parking space, and the loss in county
revenues realized from monthly parking fees. The downtown heliport
problem was compounded by the lack of a central marketing area as
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existed in New York or Chicago. Such a situation required the
construction of more than one heliport.
Even had there been a heliport atop a downtown building capable
of supporting a large helicopter, the need to satisfy government regu-
latory agencies at the local and federal level on matters of safety
still existed. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) , in particular,
felt as late as 1964 that not enough data on twin-engine turbine
passenger helicopters operating from rooftops had been accumulated to
warrant approval of that type of service. 2 This would be the case with
two other helicopter airlines.
LAA began mail and cargo service in 1947 with five Sikorsky
S-51 helicopters. This type of craft was retained until 1963. Not
capable of currying more than two to three passengers because of space
and power requirements, it was used strictly for mail service.
The ievelopment of the larger Sikorsky S-55 in 1950, the
authority to carry passengers, and the certification of the S-55 as
the first helioopter approved for commercial passenger operations3
prompted the purchase of five such models in 195S. The airline used
the S-55 in mail and air express service prior to passenger operations
beginning November, 1954.
•^William S. Reed, "Los Angeles Helicopter Utilization Grows,"
Aviation Week , March 5, 1962, pp. 57-58.
2James R. Ashlock, "Weight Limit Curtails Helicopters at Fair,"
Aviation Week
, May 18, 1964, pp. 40-41.
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The S-55 was the backbone of LAA operations for ten years. The
possibilities of twin turbine -powered helicopters were brought to the
attention of the operators in 1955; LAA conserved funds and prepared
for that day.
The limitations of the S-55 were soon realized a few years
after their purchase. Passenger service had expanded to the point that
the six-seven passenger S-55's could not handle the demand. This
limitation was complicated by the carriage of mail required under the
airline's subsidy provision. Because of the subsidy, mail received
first priority. This hampered development of the passenger market to
its full potential because passenger space was frequently taken up by
the mail.**
September 9, I960, LAA leased a Sikorsky S-62 for one year.
This became the first turbine powered helicopter in scheduled airline
service. The S-62 was designed from the start for amphibious
operations. The bottom of the fuselage was watertight and strengthened
to permit landings on water and snow. Because the S-62 was a single -
engine turbine helicopter end utilized components of the S-55 (such as
the rotor blades, main and tail rotor heads, main and intermediate
gearboxes, shafting, tail rotor pylon, and portions of the flight
controls and hydraulic systems), it was considered essentially an




Gregory, "Los Angeles Airways Expands," p. 42.
3
CAB, "New Aircraft Types," Handbook 1969 , p. 489.
4Leonard Eridgman, ed., Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1960-
1961 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960), p. 390.
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LAA entered the interim lease arrangement with Sikorsky because of two
reasons: 1) the airline had reached the saturation in terms of fleet
capacity for transporting mail, express cargo, and passengers; 2) type
certification technicalities by the FAA caused delay in the delivery
of the S-61. LAA utilized the ten-passenger S-62 to familiarize
pilots and grounds on turbine operations and to evaluate the craft's
p
performance on the line's system.
In anticipation of twin-engine service, LAA placed an order
for five S-61's in 1959. In November, 1961, three S-61's were
received and placed into partial revenue service. March 1, 1962,
LAA placed the S-61 into airline service carrying passengers--the first
line to do so. The introduction of the S-61 represents the zenith of
commercial helicopter passenger aircraft. It has not been replaced.
It was the first twin-turbine helicopter and the first to receive a
type certificate for instrument operations. Both aspects allowed safer
flights and greater utilization. The inoreased capacity (twenty-five
to twenty -eight passengers) eliminated the disadvantages of the S-55,
and the increased speed allowed more frequent service between points.
A comparison of the S-61's increased frequency ability can readily be
seen when compared with surface transportation and the older S-55.
1
Los Angeles Airways, I960 Annual Report .
o




3Los Angeles Airways, 1961 Annual Report .
4CAB, "New Aircraft Types," Handbook 1969
,
p. 489.





Table 5 gives the times between the Los Angeles International Airport
and selected cities.
TABLE 5




Alhambra 75 17 11
Ontario 150 38 25
San Bernardino 180 50 34
Source: William H. Gregory, "Los Angeles Airways Expands with
S-61's," Aviation Week . April 10, 1961, p. 45.
On October 22, 1970, LAA filed a request with the CAB to suspend
service for one year on all of its routes. At the same time, the airline
filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy
Act, listing assets of $3.2 million and liabilities of $8.1 million.
The CAB approved the request for cessation of service on December 28,
1970, on the grounds that one year should allow sufficient time for LAA
to analyze its financial position and arrange for service to be resumed. 2
"News Report," Moody's Transportation , January 22, 1971
(Lancaster, Pa.: Moody's Investor Service, Inc., 1971), p. 1831.
^CAB, Docket 22670, Order No. 70-12-146.
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Chicago Helicopter Airways (CHA)
Originally known as Helicopter Air Services, Chicago Helicopter
Airways was incorporated in the State of Delaware on November 13, 1946.
Thirteen days later the company applied for a certificate of convenience
and necessity to serve four routes out of the Chicago Municipal Airport.
On November 24, 1948, the CAB approved CHA's request. Route 96 was
established to carry mail and property over three suburban routes and
between Midway Airport and the post office roof in downtown Chicago.
Operation of the airline began on August 20, 1949, with six Bell 47D
helicopters. The 47D was a small, single engine helicopter having a
seat for the pilot and a passenger, both enclosed by a plexiglass
4
canopy.
It is apparent that CHA's development paralleled that of LAA's
in the beginning by the initiation of mail service first. July 31,
1956, CHA requested approval for passenger operations. CAB granted a
temporary to CHA on August 20, 1956, approving that request. It was
at this time that Helicopter- Air Service became Chicago Helicopter
Airways. In September, 1956, CHA accepted three seven-passenger
Sikorsky S-55 helicopters, and on November 12, 1956, commenced regularly
scheduled helicopter passenger service.
John Sherman Porter, ed., Moody's Transportation Manual 1959
(New York: D. F. Shea, Publisher, 1959), p. 1405.
2CAB, Docket 2673, Order No. B-2233.
George L. Christian, "Helicopter Mail Rings Bell in Chicago,"
Aviation Week , January 5, 1953, pp. 56-63.
4CAB, "New Aircraft Types," Handbook 1963 , p. 493.
5CAB, Docket 8151, Order No. S-10548.
Chicago Helicopter Airways, 1956 Annual Report .
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CHA's passenger route structure was centered around the three
points of Chicago, Midway Airport, and O'Hare Field, in its initial
certification in 1956. In May, 1957, the suburban points of Gary,
Indiana, and Vinnetka, Illinois, were added to the "golden triangle,"
to achieve the maximum route development of the CHA system.
The prime factor in CHA's growth up until 1962 was the opening
of O'Hare Field in 1956 in preparation for jet traffic in the summer of
1959. Because jet operations by the trunk airlines were restricted to
O'Hare Field, time conscious travelers arriving at Midway needed an
expeditious means of transportation to O'Hare Field--a distance of
p
sixteen miles. Approximately two-thirds of CHA's passengers were
carried between these two points. The other one-third traveled between
3O'Hare Field and downtown Chicago. As was the case with LAA, a high
percentage of CHA's traffic was inter-airline --approximately ninety
percent.
CHA's suburban passenger and mail routes were unsuccessful
because of the directional imbalance in passenger and mail loads.
Again, this was a problem LAA had on their routes. Mail flights
frequently had full loads going to the suburbs, but they v/ere empty
on the inbound flights. The same situation was encountered on the
passenger routes. Full passenger loads were realized inbound in the
Chicago Helicopter Airways, 1957 Annual Report .
p
Glenn Garrison, "Jets Boost Chicago Helicopter's Traffic,"
Aviation Week
,
May 9, 1960, p. 43.




4Garrison, "Jets Boost Traffic," p. 43.
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mornings and outbound in the evenings during the week. At other times
than that -just mentioned, the aircraft were empty. Figure 4
illustrates the mail and passenger route structure of CHA.
The fares in 1965 between points on the CHA system are shown in
Table 6.
TABLE 6
CHICAGO HELICOPTER AIRWAYS' POINTS SERVED AND FARES 1965






$5.00a $6.00 $ 8.00
6.00 9.00 14.00
— 6.00 8.006.00




Source: Chicago Helicopter Airways, April 1, 1965 Timetable .
(Note: Fares were the same in 1965.)











Fig. 4. --Chicago Helicopter Airv/ays System - 1960
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Source: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce,
Helicopter Air Service Program
, Hearings before
the Aviation Subcommittee, Senate, 89th Cong.,
1st sess., 1965, p. 264.
All passenger stops served by CHA were airports; consequently,
the line was spared the building and maintenance expense that other
helicopter carriers experienced. However, CHA met some frustration in
trying to establish a heliport that v/as more convenient to passengers
wishing transportation to and from the Chicago stop. Again, because of
FAA's insistence that safety of flight in downtown areas required that
passenger helicopters be equipped v/ith twin engines, CHA was not allowed
to construct a heliport at Grant Park. This ideal location was easily
accessible to the complex of hotels fronting the park and Lake Michigan.
The closest that CHA could operate to city center at the downtov/n
location was Meigs Field, which was a general aviation airport located
south of the hotel area and below the Soldiers Field Stadium. It is
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believed that this less than ideal location, plus the $1.00 plus taxi
fare, was a substantial factor in preventing CHA from realizing the
full potential of traffic between Chicago and Midway and O'Hare air-
ports. It was estimated that forty -eight percent of the total air
passenger traffic generated in the Chicago area originates or terminates
in downtown Chicago. CHA plans to utilize the rooftop of the proposed
Transportation Center were never realized. Rooftop helicopter service
was provided in downtown Chicago by CHA; but, as was the case with LAA,
it was reserved for mail flights only to the downtown post office with
the small, light Bell 47. 1
It was mentioned in the beginning that CHA began mail service
with Bell 47 's, and with the implementation of passenger operations,
they utilized the Sikorsky S-55. To increase the capacity of its
equipment to meet the steadily rising traffic between O'Hare and Meigs
Field, CHA bsgan delivery of the first of eight Sikorsky S-58 heli-
2
copters in 1957, a year after commencement of passenger operations.
In 1959 a conditional order for six Sikorsky S-61's was placed, but
unforeseen circumstances prevented acquisition of what would have been
CHA's first twin-turbine helicopter. CHA retained its aging S-58's
with the hope of converting them to a twin-turbine configuration.
Hearings before the Senate Aviation Subcommittee, Helicopter
Program
, pp. 274-80, 282, 335-42.
gChicago Helicopter Airways, 1957 Annual Report .
Chicago Helicopter Airways, 1959 Annual Report .





On December 31, 1965, CHA suspended certificated service to
coincide with the federal subsidy cutoff even though there v/ere still
eleven months remaining under its CAB certificate. The carrier con-
tinued its contract and charter air service, however. Scheduled
service was resumed on May 29, 1969, under the same name but as a
o
subsidiary of Chicago Helicopter Industries, Incorporated.
New York Airways (NYA)
NYA was incorporated in the State of Delaware on August 31,
1949, and submitted an application to the CAB on September 6 of that
year requesting the authority to operate helicopter passenger routes in
the New York City area. At the recommendation of a CAB examiner, the
CAB officially awarded NYA a temporary certificate of public convenience
and necessity on March 12, 1952, to operate the requested routes. NYA's
competitor in the award competition, Metropolitan Air Commuting, lost
because of NfA's equity obtained with a private issue instead of a
5public issue, and NYA's backing was strong. A qualification in the
award was that passenger operations would not be allowed to commence
until sufficient mail and property service had been undertaken to assure
proper handling of passengers. This qualification classified NYA as the
first helicopter airline authorized to carry passengers. LAA had applied
'''CAB, Docket 16721, Order No. B-23050.
pChicago Helicopter Industries, Inc., 1970 Annual Report .
3
Porter, Moody's Transportation Manual 1959
, p. 1408.
4CAB, Docket 4077, Order No. E-6206.
Scheduled Passenger-Copters for New York?" Aviation Week
,
November 6, 1950, p. 46.
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earlier, but its first request was denied.
On October 15, 1952, NYA began mail and cargo operations.
Unlike LAA end CHA, NYA was not blessed by the Post Office Department
in its early days of operations. The post office authorities did not
consider air mail service by helicopter necessary in the New York area
for two reasons: l) surface transportation from downtown New York to
the three main airports was considered fast enough not to impede the
quality of air mail service, and 2) helicopters were not allowed to
land on the General Post Office Building roof in the city. The powerful
New York Port Authority, who was a strong proponent of commercial
helicopter service in the city, overcame this obstacle by emphasizing
the merits of passenger service to the CAB, knowing that the right to
mail service would be granted along with Lt. Of course, as we've seen,
the right to mail carriage was granted despite the fact that ". . .no
suitable heliport on or near enough to the metropolitan post offices
..." was available. An East River heliport on Manhattan was provided
in the early stages of mail operations and a mail truck transported the
mail from there to the central post office in Manhattan.
Passenger operations began on July 8, 1953, becoming the first
United States helicopter airline to provide such a service. The pioneer
of helicopter service, LAA, did not begin passenger operations until
November 22, 1954. Also, it should be noted that British -European




2Altschul, "CAB Faces Helicopter Problem," p. 35.




passenger service. But because it only lasted from June 1, 1950, to
March 31, .1951, NYA is considered the world's first sustained service.
From the time of NYA's origin, it was that line's plan to
provide service in three areas of helicopter operations: 1) inter-
airport limousine service, 2) skybus commuter service between small
surrounding communities and New York City, and 3) airport to downtown
pManhattan service. All three aspects were to be fulfilled by NYA to
a certain extent during its history though not to the extent envisioned.
The certificate granted by GAB provided for helicopter service
in the metropolitan area including LaGuardia, New York International
(now known as John F. Kennedy International Airport), and Newark air-
ports and a Manhattan heliport. In addition, four clover-leaf segments
going out of LaGuardia and Newark airports and serving thirty-five
suburban points were authorized. To provide flexibility, any point
within a fifty -mile radius of LaGuardia and Newark airports was
authorized service without recourse to formal proceedings with the
CAB. 3
. The NYA route was designated Route 111.
The inauguration of NYA servioe in October, 1952, began with
mail flights between the three main airports in the New York City area:
John F. Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Newark. These three stops became the
foundation of NYA's passenger route structure. Later, Manhattan service
was provided variably at the Wall Street heliport, 30th Street heliport





Alexander McSurely, "Reveal Details of Transport Helicopters,"
Aviation Week
,
January 2, 1950, pp. 14-16.
3,,Copters for N.Y.?" Aviation Week
, pp. 47-48.
4
"NY Copter Service Starts," Aviation Week , p. 18.
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Building at Grand Central Station. Over the history of the airline,
suburban points such as Stamford, Connecticut; White Plains, N.Y.;
Teterboro, N.J.; and Westchester, N.Y. were served at varying times.
The plan to serve thirty -five suburban communities never materialized.
Because of the frequency of changes in the route structure, it is
difficult to provide a diagram representing the extent of maximum
route development. However, Figure 5 provides a pattern of the routes
flown by NYA in 1966. The three airports originally authorized service
in NYA's initial certification are still the primary sources of traffic,
Compared to LAA's forty mile average journey of its passengers, NYA
carried its passengers an average of twenty miles.
Table 8 gives the points served by NYA, the distance, and the
fares as of 1965.
TABLE 8
" NEW YORK AIRWAYS' POINTS SERVED,
DISTANCES, AND FARES 1965
Between • Distance (miles) Fare
Newark to Kennedy 21 $10.00
Newark to Wall Street 9 9.00
Wall Street to Kennedy 12 8.00
LaGuardia to Kennedy 10 6.00
LaGuardia to Wall Street 8 7.00
LaGuardia to Newark 16 10.00
Source: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce,
Helicopter Air Service Program
, Hearings before
the Aviation Subcommittee, Senate, 89th Cong.,

































































NYA's first heliport for passenger service was located at West
30th Street on the waterfront in Manhattan. The New York Port
Authority's eagerness for helicopter service in New York City was the
prime factor in obtaining the heliport. In November, 1960, NYA
operations were shifted from the West 30th Street location to the new
Wall Street heliport. This location was more convenient to the sub-
stantial segment of NYA's passengers who were, for the most part,
businessmen.
The controversial heliport on NYA's system was the rooftop
heliport atop the Pan American Airways building above the old Grand
Central Station in mid -Manhattan. It was realized early in NYA's
history that a rooftop heliport in a central location in Manhattan
would be essential in maximizing the potential of passenger operations
in the downtown area. A New York Port Authority survey showed that the
midtown area could provide fifty percent of all Manhattan traffic to
and from the city's three airports. And the Wall Street heliport could
not effectively serve this market because of its location at the southern
tip of Manhattan. Negotiations between NYA, Pan American Airways, and
the building corporation for the heliport began in 1962 in hopes of
placing it in operation in 1963.
"Volume of Complaints Measures Need for Helicopters," Aviation
Week
, February 25, 1957, p. 265.
2CAB, Docket 11859, Order No. 16056.
"NY Airways Revenues Linked to World's Fair, Heavier Schedules,"
Aviation Week
,
February 24, 1964, p. 39.
4Glenn Garrison, "NY Airways 107 Fleet Keyed to Subsidy,"
Aviation Week
,
October 30, 1961, p. 38.
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However, municipal and federal regulations, and local opposition
from owners of nearby buildings and citizens groups, delayed service
from this location for over two years from the date that operations
from the heliport were planned to have begun. Four municipal agencies
were required to approve the heliport site, and their job was compli-
cated by some doubt among the four over which agency had the right to
grant final approval. The four agencies were the City Planning
Commission, the Traffic Department, the Board of Estimates, and the
Department of Marine and Aviation. The biggest hurdle faced by NYA
was that the heliport was located in an area not zoned for such a
structure, and a zoning variance would not authorize its construction.
Consequently, time-consuming public hearings had to be conducted prior
to NYA's application submission to the FAA for their evaluation of
safety standards.
The FAA's approval was slow in coming for two reasons. They
felt that a tv;in-engine helicopter in a one -engine -out emergency must
be able to maintain take-off. speed on one engine and clear the heliport
edge by thirty -five feet. Landing standards in the same condition
required that the helicopter clear a fifty-foot obstacle. Because
achieving such standards was dependent on the variable of weight or
number of passengers and the two non-variables, outside temperature and
humidity, the FAA eventually granted approval by limiting the number of
passengers allowed to be carried. Consequently, the Boeing V-107's
James R. Ashlock, "Building Owners Fight Rooftop Heliport,"
Aviation Week
,
May 27, 1963, pp. 36-37.
%Y Airways Revenues Linked to Fair," p. 39.
3Ashlook, "Weight Limit Curtails Helicopters," pp. 40-41.
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twenty-five seat capacity was reduced to ten, thereby increasing the
costs of operations. A second reason was the presence of turbulence
over the landing area. The FAA eventually approved operations when
curved "cusps" were developed and installed along the edge of the
rooftop to break up turbulent vortices and provide a smooth laminar air
pflow over the landing pad.
The first organized opposition to the proposed Pan Am heliport
came from the owners of other skyscrapers near the structure, including
the Chrysler Building. They expressed concern over the danger to the
public in light of NYA's helicopter suffering two forced landings in
the Hudson River in 1962. Both were due to foreign objects being
ingested into the engines during flight. Also, the building owners
said the noise from the helicopters would be a nuisance to local
4
occupants of offices, hotels, and residences. A citizens group was
later formed and known as the Citizens Council for Proper Heliport
Planning. They stressed the safety hazards to rooftop operations and
favored ground -level waterfront sites. Commencement of operations from
this heliport were further delayed by the Citizens Council taking court
5
action against its opening.
Helicopter Service Gasps for a New Lift," Business Week
,
June 1, 1968, p. 49.
2
James R. Ashlock, "NYA Tailors Equipment Plans to Expansion of
Heliports," Aviation Week , September 17, 1962, p. 41.
James R. Ashlock, "Ingestion Causes V-107 Water Landing,"
Aviation Week
,
July 23, 1962, p. 33; and "Shield Sought for Vertol
Engine Intake," Aviation We ek
,
September 3, 1962, pp. 28-29.
4Ashlock, "Building Owners Fight," pp. 36-37.
5Joseph W. Carter, "Pan Am Heliport Foes Plan Court Battle,"
Aviation Week, January 25, 1964, p. 34.
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Heliport operations eventually began in December, 1965, with an
agreement with Pan American Airways that cost that trunk airline $4 mil-
lion. This figure consisted of loans to NYA, purchase of three Sikorsky
S-61 helicopters, and the building of a ticket office and lounge in the
Pan Am building lobby. In return, NYA gave Pan Am an option to acquire
a nineteen percent interest in NYA through a stock purchase and allowed
the airline to feature service to Pan American customers. Service vas
suspended to the Pan Am heliport on February 15, 1968, over disagree-
ments concerning Pan American subsidies to NYA.
NYA began operations in 1952 vith Sikorsky S-55 helicopters.
The press for more capacity to meet traffic demands and to provide more
economical operation caused NYA to purchase five fifteen-passenger
3Vertol V44 helicopters in 1958. Anticipation of twin -engine, turbine
helicopters and the increasing costs of the V44 classified the V44 as
an interim helicopter much like LAA's S-62. In January, 1961, NYA
ordered ten Vertol V-107's with delivery expected in June, 1962. Only
four V-107*s were eventually purchased by NYA. This twenty -five
passenger twin-turbine , tandem rotor helicopter was the Sikorsky S-61's
competitor in the commercial helicopter passenger field. The V-107
models were NYA's only operational helicopters although frequent attempts
"Roof Heliport Gives Copter Line a Lift," Business Week
,
December 25, 1965, pp. 18-20.
p




"Three NYA Vertols Begin Scheduled Passenger Flights,"
Aviation Week
,
June 2, 1958, p. 30.
4Glenn Garrison, "NYA Plans Turbine Service," Aviation Meet
,
January 9, 1961, pp. 45-47.

-52-
to supplement them with Sikorsky S-61's were planned.
^
San Francisco -Oakland Airlines (SFO)
SFO was incorporated in the State of California on January 6,
1961. On January 9, 1961, it requested that the CAB grant authority to
SFO to operate a helicopter passenger service within a 100-mile radius
of San Francisco. On November 26, 1963, the CAB approved SFO's request
to provide service specifically between San Francisco International
Airport, Metropolitan Oakland International Airport, downtown San
Francisco, downtown Oakland, Berkeley, Palo Alto, Sunnyvale, and points
o
to Marin and Contra Costa Counties.
Actually, SFO began passenger service June 1, 1961, as an air
taxi service under a blanket exemption granted by CAB prior to its
certification in 1963. 3 The airline had the authority from the
California Public Utilities Commission to operate the intrastate
service and the approval of the FAA that it met their requirements as
an air taxi operator. The request for certification by the CAB was
needed to allow SFO to carry the mail--with or without a subsidy from
the government.
^
"World's Fair Sightseeing Service Delayed," Aviation Week
,
April 27, 1964, p. 41; and "Pan Am Plans to Finance New York Airways
Service," Aviation Week , September 8, 1969, p. 24.
2CAB, Docket 12029, Order No. E-20214.
"S-62 Service is Begun in San Francisco," Aviation Week
.
June 26, 1961, pp. 42-43.




SFO was unique among the other three commercial helicopter
passenger 'Services because it was the first helicopter airline to
operate without a subsidy from the federal government. Because of this
arrangement, it was also the first to receive a permanent certificate
from the CAB. MA, CHA, and NYA initially operated under a temporary
certificate because of the experimental nature of helicopter service
and its subsidization by the CAB. SFO applied for a non-subsidy
certificate because applications by other helicopter operators requesting
p
subsidies were subject to prolonged delays.
Like LAA and NYA, the route structure of SFO was dictated by the
geography of the San Francisco area. LAA had a crowded topographical
basin jammed with communities without a rapid public surface transpor-
tation system or an air network with its attendant airfields to connect
them. NYA had the airfields, end a rapid public transportation system,
but the bridges and tunnels necessary to surmount the water barriers
created time consuming traffic congestion. SFO, too, had the airfields
and a public transportation system (although not rapid) , but the water
barrier of San Francisco Bay separated the counties, and the series of
mountains and hills that surrounded the bay were close to the shore
creating a narrow land corridor which restricted traffic flow.
Like NYA , the routes approved by the CAB for SFO operation and
the routes actually served varied considerably. Initial service prior
to certification provided service to the San Francisco airport, downtown




"New Helicopter Airline Organized," p. 43.
3CAB, Docket 12029, Initial decision, p. 4.
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San Francisco, Oakland airport, downtown Oakland, and Berkeley.
Downtown San Francisco service was suspended twice : once because of
unsafe underpinnings on the pier, in 1963;^ and another time because
cracks developed in the pilings that were impractical to repair.
Figure 6 illustrates the points served as of 1969.
SFO's fares ranged from $6.50 to $8.50. The Oakland -San
Francisco route—a distance of ten miles—cost $8.50. The airline's
fare policy was priced on a self-sustaining basis that was designed to
result in a breakeven operation at reasonably attainable load factors.
Because of SFO's belief that scheduled helicopter transportation was a
premium class product due to greater convenience and reduced travel
time, its higher fare structure averaged 48 cents per passenger mile
versus the 18 cents to 40 cents range of the three subsidized helicopter
airlines. It wss felt by SFO that these carriers were deliberately
setting low fares that would not allow breakeven operations even at a
100 percent load factor.
On the matter of heliports, it was SFO's policy to urge
communities desiring scheduled helicopter service to construct their
own heliport. It was SFO's experience that the average cost of a
heliport facility that met its standards of large, paved, lighted
parking areas; a modern and well -equipped terminal building; and a
"New Helicopter Airline Has Early Success," Aviation Week
,
October 30, 1961, p. 39.
p




San Francisco-Oakland Airlines, 1969 Annual Report .
4
Hearings before the Senate Aviation Subcommittee, Helicopter
Program
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convenient location, would cost approximately $25,000.
SFO would then pay a rental charge to the community of 25 oents
per passenger. In addition, SFO acted as a fixed-base operator in
maintaining the facility and collecting landing fees from other heli-
copter operators. It was estimated that the 25-cent charge allowed
the community to recover its $25,000 expenditure in three to five
pyears.
SFO had five heliports in operation at one time or another. The
problems with the downtown San Francisco heliport have already been
mentioned. Probably a more important reason for its closure was that
the facility did not generate the traffic that the airline expected.
The downtown Oakland heliport v/as actually the first rooftop heliport
for commercial passenger operations in the country. It was located
atop a brand new circular municipal garage with a glass -enclosed waiting
room and an elevator to the ground level. The other three heliports
were located at Berkeley, Contra Costa, aad Marin County.
SFO began passenger operations in June, 1961, with two single
-
turbine Sikorsky S-62 helicopters. A third one was leased in January,
1962, from Sikorsky with a purchase option included. In February, 1965,
SFO purchased the first of four S-61 helicopters to supplement the





'New Management Retrenching at SFO," Aviation Week
,
February 23, 1970, p. 39.






SFO felt that their fleet should utilize both models. The larger
capacity S-Sl vould be utilized in the peak hours when traffic was the
heaviest and frequency of flights the highest. The smaller S-62 would
be placed into operation on certain route segments and during slack
traffic periods.
On .July 31, 1970, SFO requested that the CAB grant emergency
authority to the airline to temporarily cease operations on all of its
routes except the San Francisco and Oakland airports segment, which
was the most profitable route. At the same time, a federal court
granted the carrier's petition declaring bankruptcy under Chapter XI
of the Bankruptcy Act. Chapter XI allows a firm to continue operations
while in the process of reorganizing. The petition listed assets of
$4.8 million and liabilities of $5.7 million. 2 The CAB approved the
request on August 13, 1970. 3
Washington Airways (WA)
Interest in providing commercial hslicopter passenger service
in the Washington, D.C. area, was expressed in 1960. The CAB reversed a
long-standing ban against consideration of expanding scheduled helicopter
operations and began an investigation of the need for such a service.
At that time Washington, D.C. ranked third in the number of flight
departures and fourth in the number of passenger boardings. In
addition, Dulles International Airport would be the third airport to





"Helicopter Airline Files for Bankruptcy," Aviation Week
,
August 10, 1970, p. 28.
3
CAB, Docket 22420, Order No. 70-80-49.
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airports being the other two.
In August, 1S63, the CAB ruled that "... public convenience
and necessity did not warrant the expenditure of the subsidies that
would have been necessary to support a helicopter servioe ..." in the
Washington area. "Annual cost of the operation vould have been two
million dollars initially, increasing to a higher amount with very
little prospect of any subsidy -free operation in less than six years."3
Helicopter service without subsidy eligibility was contemplated by the
CAB, but the eight applicants emphasized that they were unwilling to
provide the service without an annual subsidy. The CAB's reluctance
to grant a certificate with subsidies stems from the Congress' efforts
to reduce and eventually eliminate subsidy payments to the air carriers
--especially the locally oriented helicopter carriers.
By August, 1966, sufficient interest in the Washington-Baltimore
area helicopter service had been generated once again that the CAB
instituted another investigation into its feasibility. On the 29th of
that month the investigation began to determine whether public conven-
ience and necessity required the authorization of scheduled helicopter
service between National, Dulles, and Friendship airports and the
downtown city centers of Washington and Baltimore.
"•"Washington Helicopter Network," p. 29.
p
"New Congressional Interest Spurs Washington Helicopter
Analysis," Aviation Week , August 29, 1966, p. 32.
3
"CAB Rulings Reflect Helicopter Policy," Aviation Week
.
September 9, 1963, p. 38.
4Ibid.
5CAB, Docket 17665, Order No. B-24133.
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In December, 1967, the CAB's Bureau of Operating Rights stated
in its brief to the hearing examiner that the "high operating costs of
present generation helicopters would not permit economically feasible
helicopter service in the Washington, D.C ./Baltimore area," and that
"economic self-sufficiency is dependent on a vastly improved yield per
seat mile cost relationship."1 Despite this opinion, the bureau
suggested that if the hearing examiner felt that a service test was in
order, Washington Airways should be one of the five applicants awarded
a certificate. WA was a company formed by ten of the fourteen airlines
serving Washington-Baltimore, and it was felt that this company possessed
the financial ability to sustain the helicopter experiment without some
form of outside financial assistance.
^
The hearing examiner concluded thct a certificate should not be
issued because there was ". . .no real or urgent need" for the service.
Operating deficits would be so high that £-.ome form of financial assist-
ance would be required for an indefinite period, and this would not be
justified by this "luxury" service. However, on November 18, 1968,
the Board exercised its right of review and reversed the examiner's
decision. On that date it issued a temporary certificate for Route 160
to WA "... authorizing the transportation of persons, property, and
mail on a subsidy ineligible basis for a period of five years between
Dulles International Airport; the intermediate points, Washington
National Airport, downtown Washington, D.C., Friendship International
""Operation Cost Cited in Helicopter Case," Aviation Week
,
December 18, 1967, p. 33.
2Ibid.
3CAB, Docket 17665, Order No. 68-11-71, p. 1.
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Airport; and the terminal point, downtown Baltimore, Maryland."1 The
reasons for the reversal were 1) the belief that first -year traffic
volume would be ". . . available to and benefited by a helicopter
service," 2) that increased traffic volume in the following years were
anticipated, and 3) the helicopter service would assist in meeting the
needs of the area's required pattern of airline service. '
However, WA never commenced operation. Its official reason was
that there were no downtown heliports available and that the possibility
of acquiring them were minimal. On September 16, 1970, WA filed an
application seeking permission to abandon Route 160. i On November 19,
1970, the CAB reopened the Washington-Baltimore helicopter service
investigation to simultaneously rule on WA's request for abandonment
and to certify another carrier should WA's request be granted.
At the present time P3 oneer Airlines and Triangle Airways are
seeking the authority to replace WA on Roite 160. Hearings on the
investigation are scheduled for September 22, 1971.
It is interesting to note that while WA was still in the process
of inaugurating service, a short take-off and lending (STOL) equipped
non-certificated commuter airline known as Washington Airlines was









David A. Brown, "STOL, Helicopters Vie in Washington Area,"
Aviation Week
,
March 24, 1969, p. 30.
4CAB, Docket 22566.
5CAB, Docket 17665, Order No. 70-11-85.
6Ibid. , Order No. 71-2-61.
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Skyservants, the company's initial load factors varied between eleven
and fifteen percent on a sixty -four trips per day schedule. This
schedule was eventually reduced to thirty -eight trips per day on
weekdays j 22 trips on Sundays and holidays, end no service on Saturdays.
These cutbacks boosted the load factor to approximately twenty -five
percent, twenty -five percent short of its fifty percent breakeven point.
During its operations , the airline found that there was very little
city -center ^o city -center traffic. 1 In October, 1969, Washington
Airlines suspended service because of the lack of traffic. The airline
believed that a major factor was the competition received from the
twenty daily flights between Washington airports and Friendship by
certificated airlines and other air taxi and commuter carriers. A
WA representative cited the Washington Airline's inability to provide
direct downtown service as a factor in the airline's failure to
attract passengers.
Summary
World War II revealed the possibilities of helicopter operations
in the civilian sector of the economy. At the termination of the war,
helicopter mail service in the large, densely populated areas was begun,
followed by passenger service in the 1950's. The CAB's efforts to
evaluate helicopter transportation in the national air network prompted
certification of three helicopter carriers in those early years: Los
Angeles Airways, Chicago Helicopter Airways, and New York Airways.
^Brown, "STOL, Helicopters Vie," pp. 30-31.
o




Initial development of helicopter service was hampered, however,
by the lack of suitable equipment to perform economically and the
restrictions placed on the carriers* desires to purchase large military
models. By the time this restriction was lifted, the high operating
costs of helicopter service provoked the commercial carriers and
military alike to demand larger capacity, more powerful and economical
helicopters. The 1960 f s found the industry fulfilling this demand by
providing twin-turbine powered helicopters. But, unfortunately, the
manufacturing industry did not go much beyond improving the twin-
turbine helicopters. Only two larger models were produced in later
years and they were for military use. Operating costs still remained
prohibitively high.
The most importent point to remember in the helicopter airlines'
development is the military's dominance o? the helicopter industry.
Because of the helicopter carriers 1 position of being a CAB experiment,
expansion of that industry could not be considered until the service
could prove that it could become self-sufficient. Consequently, the
manufacturing industry catered to the military, its biggest and best
customer, forcing the carriers to purchase commercial versions of
military models that frequently did not suit the carriers' needs.
LAA, CHA, and NYA were eventually joined by San Francisco-Oakland
Airlines in providing helicopter service. All four were similar in that
they were locally oriented, providing service usually within a twenty-
five mile radius of the center of their operations. In most cases,
the most profitable route was between airports. Downtown service was
limited by the lack of heliports or, when downtown heliports were
available, their inconvenient location generally cancelled out the
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benefits of a downtown location. Suburban service vas costly and
unprofitable because of the one-way traffic flows that resulted in
the morning and evening hours. The helicopters operated by the
companies were the same in every way but design. Only two manufac-
turing companies provided large commercial helicopters. Fares were
relatively high compared to surface transportation, but this reflected
the high costs of providing the service. The federally subsidized
carriers—LAA, CHA, and MYA- -charged lower fares because of the
relative ease in obtaining the breakeven point as long as subsidies
continued. SFO charged higher fares because it was without benefit
of subsidies. Its fares reflected the actual costs of operations.
Washington Airways received CAB certification in 1968 but
failed to exercise its authority because of its inability to obtain
downtown heliport sites. It presently is seeking abandonment of
its route. LAA has suspended service for a year while undergoing
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act. SFO is conducting helicopter
operations under the same conditions. CHA and NYA are still in
operation but the former is operating on a reduced scale from its





The economic performance of the commercial helicopter passenger
carriers, as in most business enterprises, can be measured in terms of
their scale of operations, expenses, and revenues. These three aspects
of a carrier's operations will be defined and measured in this chapter.
Simultaneously, a comparison among the four certified carriers will be
presented in table form with appropriate comments to provide a
perspective of the level of operations performed by each carrier.
Caution should be exercised in forming judgments as to the most
successful carrier based on the data presented. Because each carrier's
route structure and operating characteristics vary substantially from
one another, such judgments would not be valid.
The structure and the methods of evaluation in this chapter
are based on a report prepared by United Research Incorporated in
December, 1963. The report, in its entirety, appears in the testimony
of hearings before the Senate Aviation Subcommittee in March, 1965,
which has been cited numerous times in this paper.
rleport on the Outlook for Vertical -lift Aircraft in Scheduled
Commercial Transportation prepared for the United Aii*craft Corporation,
the Boeing Company, and the General Electric Company; A. H. Nordling,
Project Director (Cambridge, Mass.: United Research Incorporated,





The scale of operations of a carrier represents a measure of
the degree of service offered to the public and the level of accept-
ability by the public of helicopter services. This measure is reflected
in the amount of traffic growth --or lack of growth.
One measure of expanding traffic is the number of passenger
originations . The CAB defines "passenger originations" as the number
of revenue passengers boarding aircraft in scheduled service at the
points of initial enplanement on the reporting carrier's system with
the return portion of a round trip counted separately as an initial
origination. Passenger enplanements are the total number of revenue
passengers boarding an aircraft, including originating and stopover
p
or on line transfer passengers.'" A revenue passenger is a person
receiving air transportation from an air carrier for which remuneration
is received by the air carrier. Table 9 illustrates the number of
annual passenger originations by carrier from 1953 when passenger
service commenced until the close of 1970.
Another measure of traffic and the scale of operations is the
number of revenue passenger miles flown by the carrier. A revenue
passenger mile is simply one revenue passenger transported one mile in
revenue service. It is computed by summation of the products of the
revenue aircraft miles flown on each inter-airport hop multiplied by
the number of revenue passengers carried on that hop. Table 10
illustrates the trend experienced by the carriers.
l-CAB, "Glossary of Air Transport Terms," Handbook 1969 , p. 538.






Year Total CHA LAA NYA SFO
1953 1 - - 1 -
1954 8 - - 8 -
1955 29 - 5 24 -
1956 64 1 20 43 -
1957 153 55 30 68 -
1958 230 109 31 90 -
1959 366 204 42 120 -
1960 490 309 39 142 -
1961 430 245 41 144 -
1962 358 93 77 188 -
1963 458 50 167 241 -
1964 607 39 197 253 118
1955 719 32 243 306 138
1966 1067 V) 307 527 233
1967 1220 - 394 537 289
1968 1041 - 306 408 327
1969a 744 5 165 254 320
1970b 573 13 62 268 230
• Passenger enplanements . Passenger originations not available,








Yeer Total CHA LAA NYA SFO
1953 26 - - 26 -
1954 183 - 3 180 -
1955 628 - 152 476 -
1956 1585 14 771 800 m
1957 3275 895 1124 1256 -
1956 4885 1991 1168 1726 -
1959 7477 3667 1476 2334 -
1960 9475 5202 1355 2918 -
1961 8604 4224 1507 2873 m
1962 8192 1703 2832 3657 -
1963 12510 1023 6706 4781 -
1964 16003 774 7985 5060 2184
1965 18811 597 9375 6170 2669
1966 25420 - 11530 9370 4520
1967 29670 - 14762 9556 5352
1968 24856 - 11369 7554 5933
1969 17023 78 6228 4812 5905
1970 11341 224 2336 4983 3798
Source: CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics , 1963, 1969, 1970.
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The data in both of the preceding tables reflects an overall
rising trend in passenger demand and increased service by the helicopter
carriers tip until 1967 when traffic began to fall off.
CKA had the greatest rate of growth among the helicopter
carriers until the unexpected shift of fixed-wing airline traffic from
Midway to O'Hare Field in mid -1962 ruined CHA's most profitable route.
Passenger originations declined drastically as a result of that situa-
tion, and revenue passenger miles dropped as well. New routes were not
initiated to make up for the loss of traffic because of reduced federal
subsidy revenues. 1 As was mentioned in Chapter Two, on December 31,
1965, CHA suspended operations until May 29, 1969.
LAA's decline in traffic and revenue miles flown from 1968 was
due to at least three factors. In 1968 the carrier suffered two
catastrophic S-61 ac;o.Ldents--one in May, and the other in August. Both
accidents were similar in that it was believed that each helicopter
lost a blade in flight, causing instant loss of control and death to
the occupants upon impact with the ground. The accidents received
nationwide publicity, causing a drop in passenger volume. In addition,
the carrier is believed to have lost traffic to a number of short take-
off and landing (STOL) equipped commuter airlines operating over LAA's
routes. Another factor was the overall sluggishness of the 1969
economy which affected airline travel in the country. Finally, LAA
suffered a six month, ten day strike beginning in December, 1969,
Hearings before the Senate Aviation Subcommittee, Helicopter
Program, p. 255.
2
"S-61*s Inspected; Carriers Resume Flights," Aviation Week ,
August 26, 1968, p. 1-29.
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until May, 1970. 1
NYA also suffered from the effects of, LAA's accidents and the
depressed economy.
SFO, the only non -subsidized operator, began passenger service
in 1961, but because certificated operations did not begin until late
1963, operational data vas not recorded until 1964. The carrier's
traffic and revenue passenger miles increased steadily until 1969. The
economy's slowdown and air traffic control delays that caused missed
SFO connections were blamed by the carrier for the decline that year.
In addition, SFO was forced to gradually cut service to decrease
expenses because of a deteriorating working capital situation.
Growth of traffic in any segment of the transportation industry
is related to the level of service provided. One measure of service is
the number of available seat -miles offered by the carrier. An available
seat -mile is the aggregate of the product?; of the aircraft miles flown
on each inter-airport hop multiplied by the number of seats available
on that hop. This represents the total passenger -carrying capacity
offered. As a clarification, seats available means the number of seats
installed in an aircraft exclusive of any seats not offered for sale to
the public by the carrier. Table 11 indicates the increasing capacity
"Los Angeles Airways Costly Strike Ends," Aviation Week
,
May 11, 1970, p. 27.
^Richard G. O'Lone, "New Management Retrenching at SFO,"
Aviation Week, February 23, 1970, pp. 39-40.
3
"IIelicopter Airline Files for Bankruptcy," p. 23.




up until 1967. The year 19G3 marks the full scale use of the large
twin -engine helicopters.
The declining capacity suffered by LAA and NYA from 1968 on is
indicative of reduced services brought on by conditions mentioned
previously.
Increased capacity by itself, however, will not achieve economic
self-sufficiency of an airline, be it fixed-wing or helicopter. This
additional capacity must be purchased by more passengers to be productive,
A measure of this productivity is the revenue passenger load factor .
Defined as the percent that revenue passenger miles are of available
seat-miles in revenue passenger service, it represents the proportion
-i
of aircraft seating capacity that is actually sold and utilized.
Table 12 presents this proportion.
It is readily apparent that the load factors parallel the trends
in the tables. SPO's extreme drop in load factor in 1965 was due to
delivery of Sikorsky S-61's while retaining their S-62's.
Total operating expenses are expenses incurred in the perform-
ance of air transportation. It is divided between direct aircraft
operating expenses, and indirect operating and ground expenses. 2 Direct
expenses are those involved in flying operations, direct maintenance,
and flight equipment depreciation. On the other hand, indirect expenses
include indirect maintenance, general services and administration (e.g.,
passenger service, promotion and sales, and aircraft and traffic













Year Total CHA LAA NYA SFO
1953 191 mt a 191 -
1954 716 - 41 675 -
1955 1708 - 749 959 -
1956 3561 63 1781 1717 -
1957 8136 2599 2181 3356 -
1958 11419 5343 2210 3866 -
1959 14628 7234 2615 4779 -
19G0 18764 10286 2434 5504 -
1961 18276 10173 2753 5350 -
1962 20125 4817 7151 8157 -
1963 27657 2629 14588 10440 -
1964 34166 2154 16766 10328 4917
1965 41013 1763 18481 12023 9146
1966 51992 - 22730 15548 13714
1967 62041 - 29781 18479 31781
1968 59983 - 28909 14969 16105
1969 42962 38 17956 8712 16256
1970 31700 391 8280 11684 11425















1954 25.6 - 7.3 26.7 M
1955 36.8 - 20.3 49.6 -
195G 44.5 22.2 43.3 46.6 *»
1957 40.3 34.4 51.5 37.4 mm
1958 42.8 37.3 52.9 44.6 -
1959 51.1 50.7 56.5 48.8 m»
1960 50.5 48.1 55.7 53.0 -
1961 47.1 41,5 54,7 53.7 -
1962 40.7 35.4 39.6 44.8 ••
1963 45.2 38.9 46.0 45.8 mm
1964 46.8 35.9 47.6 49.0 44.4
1965 45.4 33.9 50.7 51.3 29.2
1966 48.9 - 50.7 60.3 33.0
1967 47.8 - 49.6 51.7 38.8
1968 41.5 - 39.3 50.7 36.8
1969 39.9 43.8 35.0 55.2 36.3
1970 35.7 57.3 28.2 42.6 33.2
Source: CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics, 1963, 1969, 1970.
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cost per available ton-mile . Operating expense or cost has
been previously defined. An available ton-mile is the aggregate of the
products of the aircraft miles flov/n on each inter -airport hop multi-
plied by the available aircraft capacity measured in tons (instead of
seats as in available seat -mile) for that hop. It represents the
traffic -carrying capacity offered. A ton would include passengers,
cargo, and mail. Table 13 provides an insight into the trends in
operating expenses per available ton-mile.
It is apparent that total operating expenses have gradually
declined since turbine equipment vas introduced in 1962. However, to
put this cost per available ton«mile in perspective, local service
carriers (known as "feeder lines") have a far less expensive rate.
Taking three years in the period when helicopter costs were the least
expensive, local service carrier total costs per available ton-mile
were .475, .460, and .398 cents in 1963, 1965, and 1967, respectively.
^
Table 14 provides information on the direct operating expense
per available ton-mile. Just as total operating expense has come down
since 1953, so, too, has total direct operating expense declined. But,
again, when the helicopter carriers' direct operating expense is compared
to the longer range and larger carrying capacity local service carriers,
the tremendous expense of helicopter operations is revealed. In a five
year period, the total direct operating expense per available ton-mile








TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES PER AVAILABLE TON -MILE
(All Services)
Year Total CHA LAA NYA SFO
1953 06.746 $6,764 $5,087 $8,555 Mi
1954 6.766 6.913 4.779 8.753 -
1955 6.762 6.779 4.384 10.000 -
1956 6.380 7.814 3.950 9.090 •»
1957 4.817 3.885 3.916 6.339 Ml
1958 • 3.980 2.673 3.872 6.156 -
1959 4.042 2.911 3.796 5.985 -
1960 3.762 2.659 4.272 5.760 mi
1961 4.034 2.717 4.227 6.438 -
1962 3.793 3.194 2.817 5.223 -
1963 2.917 3.834 1.879 4.227 -
1964 2.828 4.246 1.772 4.463 2.550
1965 2.675 4.514 1.645 4.118 2.553
1966 2.914 - 1.557 5.017 2.376
1967 2.720 - 1.546 4.891 2.025
1968 2.640 - 1.793 4.481 2.091
Source: CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics, 1963, 1969.
1964 to .168 cents in 1968. * This contrasts drastically with the varjring
$1.00 plus figure in the same period for helicopter carriers.




DIRECT OPERATING EXPENSES PER AVAILABLE TON-MILE
Scheduled Services
Year Total CHA LAA NYA SFO
1953 $4,213 $3,955 $2,608 $5,007 $ -
1954 3.863 3.782 3.116 4.670 -
1955 3.625 3.323 2.633 5.108 -
1956 3.223 3.827 2.280 4.257 -
1957 2.534 2.203 2.122 3.143 -
1958 2.150 1.600 1.934 3.151
1959 2.238 1.700 1.810 3.365 -
1960 2.102 1.632 1.946 3.157 -
1961 2.102 1.552 1.845 3.304 -
1962 1.373 1.590 1 441 2.517 M
1963 1.433 1.662 1.039 2.000 -
1964 1.450 2.006 .993 2.164 1.355
1955 1.331 1.889 .883 2.009 1.266
1966 1.083 M .849 1.945 1.264
1967 1.386 M .813 2.553 1.107
1968 1.281 w» .962 2.143 1.084





With the costs of operations discussed, the other side of the
coin—revenues—should be mentioned.
In the beginning stages of development, passenger revenue yields
covered only a small portion of the costs of producing a passenger mile
of traffic. But under the influence of an increased scale of operation
as evidenced by passenger originations up until 1967 and the improved
economic performance of the turbine helicopter, the cost/yield relation-
ship has shown a substantial decline. But there is still an urgent need
to improve this relationship. Table 15 compares the total operating
cost per passenger mile with revenue yield per passenger mile. This
table readily shows the reason why subsidy assistance has been needed
by helicopter carriers since 1957. In every year, except one, the costs
per revenue passenger mile exceed revenue yields per revenue passenger
mile in a range from six cents to $1.30. The one exception is SFO in
1966 when revenue yield exceeded costs by one cent.
To a certain extent Table 16 overstates the subsidy need in
that it considers only passenger revenue yields. In the early years of
operations, the carriage of mail and cargo was a substantial portion of
non-subsidy revenue. Nevertheless, the relationship between passenger
revenue yield and cost is the most significant because the commercial
helicopter carrier's role in the national transportation system is one
of meeting passenger needs.
One important point that should be apparent is the much improved
yields per revenue passenger mile since 1957. Again, this was due to
the more efficient twin-turbines with increased capacity.
A final observation of the need for subsidy assistance can be
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opereting costs of the helicopter industry and each carrier. As in
Table 15, 1957 is the beginning year because that was the first full
year of passenger operations for the three original carriers.
In this table, no helicopter carrier reached the breakeven
point in its operations. The smallest consistent spread between
revenues and expenses was experienced by the non-subsidized SFO.
Factors Affecting Economic Performance
From the preceding discussion of scheduled helicopter operations,
it is apparent that it is a high cost operation. There are several
reasons why this is so.
Scheduled helicopter passenger service is basically a short-
haul operation. The average stage length in 1965 was eighteen miles
compared to 100 miles for local service oarriers. In the air trans-
portation industry, short-haul operations are the most expensive to
perform. Two factors account for this situation. Wear and tear is
increased substantially because of the more frequent landings and take-
offs. This shortens the lift of many parts on the helicopter and more
frequent maintenance is required. Another reason for the expense of
short-haul operations is the frequent ground time incurred in loading
and unloading the aircraft, in addition to preparing and clearing for
take-off. This results in lower utilization of the equipment than if
it were airborne for longer stage lengths as in fixed-wing airoraft.
Low utilization tends to increase costs.
Another problem in helicopter operations is the high mainte-
nance costs incurred by the carriers. This is caused by the almost




oonstant motion of the helicopter's parts. Unlike the fixed-wing
aircraft where lift is achieved by the smooth airflow across its
stationary wing, the helicopter must achieve both its lift and forward
motion through its constantly rotating rotor. Not only is the rotor
moving continually, but components such as the gear boxes, transmis-
sions, drive shafts, rotor heads, and blades are in continual motion.
Obviously, this causes stress which requires more frequent inspections
and overhaul maintenance than fixed -wing aircraft. *-
In addition, helicopter engines operate at almost top speed
during a large portion of their flight which means increased fuel
consumption and engine stress. A fixed-wing aircraft's engine would
operate at maximum power only during take-off. Another source of wear
and tear is that the helicopter itself is operating at close to its
maximum airspeed. All these factors combine to increase the mainte-
nance costs of the helicopter. In 1963 the average maintenance costs,
including direct maintenance and maintenance burden, for two engine,
fixed-wing piston aircraft in local service operation was thirty-five
cents per aircraft mile. But the piston helicopter and turbine -powered
helicopter cost an average $1.01 and $1.89 per mile, respectively.
The Future Po s sibility of
an Economic Helicopter
A student seeking information on the future of the pure heli-
copter is likely to be confronted with varying opinions. Some sources
express the opinion that there is no future for the aircraft while




These positions will be presented in the following paragraphs. In
addition, other methods of air transportation that are likely to
compete with the helicopter in the future will be discussed.
Fortune magazine, in an article featuring the helicopter
manufacturing industry, felt that vertical and short take-off and
landing (v/STOL) aircraft were the only answer to the high operating
costs of the helicopter. It felt that under the right conditions,
airport feeder lines utilizing sixty -passenger commercial versions of
Sikorsky's S-61 or Vertol's V-107 could compete profitably with surface
taxis. But their two million dollar purchase price was extremely high.
Also they would have to be kept flying on a heavy schedule to spread the
indirect operating expense and to provide service frequent enough to
attract sufficient traffic. Despite the magazine's claim that the
service could compete profitably with the taxi, it felt that "few, if
any, heliports would generate sufficiently heavy traffic of affluent
passengers for such a schedule." They concluded that the potential
market was not large enough for the manufacturer to recover the costs
of converting their present models to larger versions.
New developments in aviation engineering have placed the heli-
copter in a family of types that have similar operating characteristics.
The term "helicopter" is being classified more broadly as vertical take-
off and landing (VTOL) aircraft. 2 "VTOL aircraft are those capable of
ascending or descending vertically, with a capability of remaining fixed
•^Philip Siekman, "The Big New Whirl in Helicopters," Fortune ,
April, 1966, pp. 210-14.
2
"Civil Helicopter Total May Double by 1971," Aviation Week .
March 7, 1966, p. 290.
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vith no vertical or horizontal movement, commonly referred to as a
hover. VTOL's possess a cheater potential for an increased hourly-
utilization because they require less non-productive air and ground
maneuvering time. This advantage reduces costs over short hauls and
reduces terminal congestion because a VTOL aircraft can approach or
depart from any direction. The main disadvantage in VTOL aircraft is
that at this time a suitable commercially viable vehicle does not
exist. All are on the drawing or in a limited testing phase.
*
VTOL aircraft are classified into three categories: rotor
driven, propeller driven, and jet lift. This discussion will be
restricted to rotor driven aircraft. Rotor driven VTOL's include the
pure helicopter which is in service today. The preceding discussion
on the operating expenses incurred by helicopter operations indicates
that this aircraft is not yet an economically sound machine. Engineering
limitations, such as the high power needed for wingless lift with
resultant high fuel consumption, are one reason for its economical
unsoundness.
Compound helicopters are classified as rotor driven also. These
aircraft utilize a separate forward propulsion system in addition to the
main rotor overhead as in the pure helicopter. A small wing is added to
the fuselage to transfer lift from the rotor to the wing as the air-
craft's speed increases. The compound helicopter's speed is greater than
^J.S., CAB, "Planning Study STOL-VTOL Air Transportation Systems,"










the pure helicopter but it is limited by the rotor. 1
The stopped/stowed rotor concept is the third type of rotor
driven aircraft end it is an attempt to overcome the limitations of
the compound helicopter. This concept involves completely stopping
the rotor at some particular forward flight speed. Once stopped, the
aircraft is accelerated to a higher cruise speed with lift provided
by the wing and the stationary rotor blades. Areas of concern with
this type of aircraft are the distortion of the rotor blades and air-
craft handling qualities. The stowed rotor concept finds the aircraft
taking off as a compound helicopter and then, at a speed greater than
the stall speed of the wing, the rotor is stopped, folded, and retracted
into the fuselage to convert to conventional wing configuration. Both
concepts require a considerable amount of mechanical and aerodynamic
development before they cen be considered for application to operational
commercial aircraft.
These are a few of the different ^ypes of VTOL aircraft that
could replace today's uneconomical helicopter. But there are some who
believe that the pure helicopter still has an important role to play in
air transportation. Rapid progress in VTOL technology since the intro-
duction of turbine service and the knowledge derived from Vietnam-induced
research and development promise fast, convenient, and economical short-
haul transportation. Decreased engine weight and fuel consumption are
expected to result from the application of advanced technology. The
specific weights of the helicopter's rotor systems have been improved







due to the introduction of advanced materials such as boron and
graphite filament composites into blade construction. Major improve-
ments in structural strength have evolved because of the high strength
and stiffness of advanced fiber-reinforced composite materials. 1
VTOL design trends can be grouped into five classes. Class One
consists of the present Sikorsky S-61 and Vertol 107 twenty-five
passenger helicopters. Their shortcomings are poor economics, low
passenger appeal, inadequate schedule reliability, and the lack of
Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) capability on take-off and landings on
helipads.
Class Two aircraft consists of thirty-seat versions of the
Class One helicopters with small improvements in economics, performance,
and reliability. Class Three vehicles consist of fifty to seventy-five
seat helicopters derived from the current CH-46, CH-53, and CH-64
military models. Their economics, performance, and reliability are
superior to the two former classes.
Class Four consists of ninety to 100-seat helicopters specific-
ally designed for the commercial market of the 1970' s. It is estimated
that their direct operating costs match that of the fixed -wing DC -9 and
737 jets at ranges from fifty to one hundred miles. These large vehicles
would make possible a profitable large-scale VTOL operation. Their
reliability would be equal to current jets and vibration levels would be
Report of the Transportation Workshop, 1967, on Air Transports;
tion 1975 and Beyond: A Systems Approach , Bernard A. Schiever and
William W. Seifert, co-chairmen (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press,
1968), pp. 226-30.
%bid . t p. 230. 3Ibid«,
4Ibid.
, P- 235 «

-85-
acceptsble. IFR capability on helipad operations would be available. 1
Class Five vehicles vould be comprised of compound helicopters,
tilt wings, tilt rotors, stowed rotors, fan-in-wing, and propulsive
wing. The tilt -wing and tilt -rotor is expected to have the lowest
direct operating costs of all VTOL's. 2
Clearly, economical helicopters can be developed provided that
there is a market for such aircraft and there are funds available for
continued research. But despite the current interest in the Northeast
Corridor transportation segment between Washington, D.C. and Boston,
Massachusetts, that vould provide a ready short-haul market for VTOL
aircraft, funds are lacking. The first federal contract award to a
helicopter company in six years was recently granted the Vertol Division
of the Boeing Company for further research on a heavy lift helicopter.
No other federal funds have been provided.
Summary
Scheduled helicopter service grew almost continually since its
beginning in 1953. This is reflected in the rise of the total number
of passenger originations and total revenue passenger miles flown by the
scheduled helicopter carriers. This growth continued until 1968 when
LAA suffered two disastrous helicopter accidents that affected the whole
commercial helicopter industry. Since then, passenger originations end











Total available seat miles in scheduled helicopter service grew
steadily since 1953 as larger capacity helicopters replaced older models.
The dramatic increase in 1963 was due to the introduction of Sikorsky's
and Vertol's twin-turbine helicopters that doubled the capacity of
previous helicopters. Again, a decline set in in 1968 when reduced
operations were brought on by rising costs and declining patronage.
The total revenue passenger load factor varied from year to year
in the forty to fifty percent range for the most part. However, reduced
patronage of the helicopter services can be seen in 1968, 1969, and
1970 when load factors began to decline to the upper thirties.
Total operating expenses and total direct operating expenses
per available ton-mile indicate an almost steady decline from 1953.
In that year total operating expenses declined from $6.75 to $2.64 in
1968. Direct operating expenses declined from $4.21 to $1.28 in the
same period. This reduction in operating expenses reveals an improve-
ment in operating knowledge of helicopter operations and a tremendous
improvement in the helicopters themselves. Introduction of the twin-
turbine helicopters in 1960-1961 resulted in a momentary increase in
expenses because of operational problems with the new equipment, but
once they were resolved, expenses declined sharply in 1963.
Even though expenses declined in the scheduled helicopter
industry, they were still too high in comparison with fixed wing air-
craft operated by the local carriers. Where total helicopter operating
expenses were in the $2.65 to $2.95 range in the 1960's, local service
carriers were incurring total costs of forty to fifty cents. Direct
operating costs of helicopter equipment from 1964 to 1968 was more than
a dollar per available ton-mile, while the local carriers were incurring
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expenses of seventeen to twenty -three cents.
The economic picture of commercial helicopter passenger service
is revealed in the comparison of total operating costs per passenger
mile and the revenue yield per passenger mile. Improved helicopter
models have generally reduced costs while et the same time improving
the yields. But still the difference between yield and cost has been
a negative figure since 1957, except for SFO who managed to post a one-
cent gain in 1966. The lowest negative difference achieved was ten
cents in 1966. The widest difference occurred in 1957 when the spread
between total cost per passenger mile and yield per passenger mile was
$1.23.
The economic picture also is reveeled when the difference
between transportation revenue and total operating cost is measured.
Without federal subsidies, total costs exceeded total transportation
revenues in every year from 1957 --ranging from a low of $3,759,000 in
1957 to a high of $5,784,000 in 1962.
Clearly, commercial helicopter passenger service is not an
economically viable venture with the present equipment. Costs of
operation far exceed passenger revenues.

CHAPTER IV
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD'S ROLE
Origin
The Air Commerce Act of 1926 was the initial federal law
regulating civil aviation in the United States. It directed the
Department of Commerce to promote air transportation by encouraging the
development of airport, civil airways, and navigational facilities.
The Act's emphasis was on fostering safety in civil aviation.
The Post Office Department's role in aviation at this time was
considerable, in that it was responsible for its initial development.
It exercised what little economic regulation there was by issuing
equipment and operating requirements for mail contract awards. But
early in 1934, the Post Office Department canceled all air mail
contracts existing at that time, on the grounds that the original air
mail awards had been issued out through a collusive spoils system
instead of according to proper competitive bidding as intended. An
attempt by the Army to fly the mail proved to be costly and plagued by
accidents and it was soon terminated.
Joseph L. Nicholson, Air Transportation Management (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951), p. 146.
2
Ibid.
Richard E. Caves, Air Transport end Its Regulators (Cambridge,




Because of this situation, the Air Mail Act of 1934 was developed
and sanctioned by the Congress. The competitive bidding process for air
mail routes was revised and responsibility for public control of the air-
transport business was divided among three governmental agencies. The
Interstate Commerce Commission was responsible for establishing the rates
of mail pay for each route. The Bureau of Air Commerce, a new agency
founded by the Air Mail Act, was in charge of safety and technical
regulation.
The third responsible party was the Post Office Department. It
awarded contracts for air moil service and decided the routes and
schedules that the carriers should fly. It retained its economic con-
trol over the air industry in that it controlled entry into the industry
"... since air -passenger travel was then in its infancy and a success-
ful business operating without a subsidized air-mail contract was
pimpossible." This situation was no less true in 1947 for the helicopter
air transport industry. Because helicopters in that period were not
capable of providing profitable passenger service, a helicopter operator
could only gain entry into the industry by the award of an air mail
contract.
By 1935, the shortcomings of the Air Mail Act were apparent to
all, including the three agencies. The division of responsibility among
the three had overlapping conditions that made administration difficult.
And there was a loophole in the competitive bidding process. The Federal
Aviation Commission, founded by the Air Mail Act to make policy recom-
mendations, made an intensive study in 1935 and recommended that a single
1




agency should be responsible for the regulation of the air transport
industry. Rivalry among the governmental departments over who should
be granted these sole powers as recommended by the Commission delayed
action for three years. 1 On June 23, 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938 was passed by the Congress and signed by President Franklin D.
o
Roosevelt.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 as amended remains the
primary statute governing public control of civil aviation in the
United States. The Federal Aviation Commission's recommendation of the
establishment of a single authority to govern civil aviation was realized
by this Act by the creation of the Civil Aeronautics Authority. The
Authority was composed of five members who were appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Their terra of
office was six years, and not more than three members were to be
appointed from the same political party. The Civil Aeronautics Authority
was comparable to the Interstate Commerce Commission in that both were
intended to be independent regulatory agencies, free from executive
interference.
In 1940, by executive order of the President, a reorganization
of the Authority took place. A Civil Aeronautics Administration was
established and placed under the responsibility of the Department of
Commerce. Its function was the development of physical facilities for
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prescription of safety rules and standards) and civilian pilot training
programs, and the issuance of aircraft, airmen, and other certificates
required in the interest of safety.
In addition, the Civil Aeronautics Authority became the Civil
Aeronautics Board with all the former organization's previously
mentioned characteristics. The CAB was concerned with the economic
regulation and promotion of the air transportation industry or "the
business of transporting persons, property, and mail by air ..."
Except for the task of prescribing safety rules and standards, the CAB
was not concerned officially with the safety aspects of aviation.
Despite the 1940 reorganization and contrary to the Civil Aeronautics
Administration's subordination to the Secretary of Commerce, the CAB
p
maintained its independence as a regulatory agency.
The final change that brings the civil aviation governmental
bureaucracy up to the present took place in 1958. In that year, the
Federal Aviation Act created the Federal Aviation Agency (now known as
the Federal Aviation Administration under the Department of Transporta-
tion) to replace the Civil Aviation Administration and to assume its
functions. The power to prescribe safety rules and standards, previously
held by the CAB, was assumed by the Federal Aviation Agency, making that
agency responsible for all matters pertaining to air safety in the United
States. The Act's impact upon the CAB was that it reconfirmed and
reinforced the continuation of that independent agency as the regulatory







Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 relating to economic regulation. 1
Regulation of Air Service by the CAB
The general policy the CAB is required to follow in the
performance of its duties was specifically stated and recorded by the
Congress in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Its importance in
understanding the CAB's regulatory function merits its quotation:
Declaration of Policy
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under
this Act, the Board shall consider the following, among other
things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with
the public convenience and necessity.
(a) The encouragement and development of an air transporta-
tion system properly adapted to the present and future needs of
the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the
Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such a manner
as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure
the highest degree of safety in, such transportation, and to
improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by,
air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient
service by air carriers of reasonable charges, without unjust
discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair
or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to
the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of air safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of Civil
Aeronautics. ^
Titles IV and X of the Civil Aeronautics Act contain the detailed




Caves, Air Transport and Its Regulators , p. 126
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section in Title IV that relates to this study and provides some under-
standing of the CAB's role in commercial helicopter passenger service
development is mentioned in the following paragraphs.
Section 401 states that no air carrier shall operate in inter-
state commerce without a certificate of convenience and necessity.
Applications for such certificates are to be granted if the CAB finds
"that the applicant is fit, willing, and able to perform such trans-
portation properly, and to conform to the provisions of this Act and
the rules, regulations, and requirements of the Board hereunder, and
that such transportation is required by the public convenience and
necessity." The important criteria by which the CAB must determine
whether a particular proposal is in the public interest is based on
the present and future needs of the commerce of the United States, the
postal service, and the national defense. If the proposed service is
believed to oe important to postal requirements or national defense,
o
cost is of secondary importance. a
Section 403 requires that carriers establish and adhere to
rates in such form as the CAB prescribes. The rates must be filed v/ith
the CAB and made available for public inspection. 3
Section 404 grants comprehensive authority to the CAB to reject,
modify, or revise fares. 4 The CAB must consider at least three factors
in determining a just fare: "... effect on the movement of traffic,
1Ibid
. t pp. 127-28.
2
Nicholson, Air Transportation Management , p. 155,







the public interest in securing transportation at the lowest possible
cost, and the carrier's need for revenues sufficient to provide adequate
service under honest, economical, and efficient management. m1
Section 406 directs the CAB to fix fair and reasonable rates
for the carriage of mail by aircraft. In deciding the proper mail rate,
CAB is directed to consider the need of each air carrier for mail com-
pensation "sufficient to insure the performance of such service and
together with all other revenue of the air carrier to enable such air
carrier under honest, economical and efficient management to maintain
and continue the development of air transportation . . ."in the United
States.
This mail rate provision is the means by which the CAB is able
to financially assist a carrier and, thus, encourage the development of
an air system in the interest of the commerce of the United States, the
postal service, and the national defense. This provision also authorizes
the CAB to increase mail rates to pay for a carrier's losses incurred in
non-mail services to insure the delivery of the mail. Another require-
ment of Section 406 calls for the carriers to periodically submit
p
operating, traffic, financial, and other reports to the CAB.
Section 408 lists various types of transactions between specified
classes of persons which are unlawful in the absence of CAB approval.
These transactions relate to mergers of air carriers and acquisition of
control of air carriers by other carriers.









Section 409 makes unlawful interlocking relationships between
air carriers and other common carriers or persons engaged in any phase
of aeronautics or persons whose principal business is the holding of
stock in or controlling an airline, or any other person engaged in any
phase of aeronautics, without the consent of the CAB.
Section 416, the final provision of Title IV, authorizes the
CAB to classify carriers, make rules and regulations for each class,
and also to exempt from any or all requirements of the title any carrier
or class of carriers for whom enforcement would be an undue burden
because of the limited extent of, or unusual circumstances affecting,
the operations of a carrier.
Subsidies
A section devoted to a brief discussion of subsidies is important
to any study of airline history. This financial support enabled the air
transportation industry to overcome the initial costs of operation until
they became self-sufficient and self -supportive.
Subsidies are particularly important when discussing helicopter
service because its existence fostered the commercial helicopter's birth
and its deletion spelled disaster for this industry in most cases.
This section is divided into two parts. First, a discussion of
the general subject of subsidies, how it evolved, and the procedures
necessary to obtain a subsidy will be presented. The last part will be
devoted to subsidies in relation to the helicopter industry; particularly,
the controversy that arose when the subsidy came under Congressional








The significance of Section 406 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 in relation to subsidies has been cited earlier. By the terms of
that section, subsidy payments have always been handed to the air
carriers in association with payments for carrying mail. Prior to the
1938 Act, the Post Office was directly in charge of buying the services
of commercial aviation with a free hand in the amount of subsidy to be
given. After 1938, the system persisted with appropriations from the
Post Office including whatever volume of subsidy the CAB decided to
grant
.
The justification for subsidy payments by the CAB was based on
three parts of Section 406. Section 406(a) states that the CAB shall
fix fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the transportation
of mail by aircraft. Section 406(c) further states that the compensatory
(known also cs service mail) portion of such compensation shall be paid
by the Post Office Department on the basis of rates established by the
CAB for that purpose. And Section 406(b) stipulates that the remainder
of the total mail compensation (or the subsidy portion) shall be paid
by the CAB "in order to further and promote the development of air
transportation to the extent and of the quality required for the commerce
of the United States, the postal service, and the national defense. "^
Once a carrier receives a certificate to carry mail, provision
of mail pay, including subsidy, is provided until the certificate









operating loss "incurred under honest, economical, and efficient
management," and to provide it an opportunity to earn a fair return
(after taxes) on the investment used.
The initiation of subsidy cases was normally begun by the
carrier filing a petition with the CAB. The amount of subsidy granted
to a carrier was normally the sum of
:
1) the carrier's break-even need for a forecast 12-month period
(e.g., the excess of expenses over revenues);
2) the capital cost for a fair return; and
3) income taxes.
Subsidy is paid on a monthly basis by the CAB.
The subsidy rates established by the CAB offered only an
opportunity for a carrier to earn a profit, but they did not guarantee
it. Because the rates were "closed," meaning that the subsidy was fixed
at an absolute amount over an indefinite future period, losses incurred
by the carriers in past years could not be made up with a subsidy in
fixing future rates. This policy, it was felt, encouraged carrier
management to improve their -operations to achieve better earnings
4because under the closed rate he bore the risk of losses.
In establishing a subsidy rate, the CAB's procedures provided
for a detailed analysis of each carrier's
1) reasonableness of capacity operated;
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3) proper investment base to be recognized for rate purposes
and the related fair return; and
4) amount of revenue to be recognized for rate purposes. *-
The carrier's subsidy petition must include a twelve -month forecast of
operations upon which the subsidy claim is based. Any clarifications
needed or claims not substantiated prompt a CAB request for additional
pinformation.
Helicopter Subsidies
It is apparent from what has been written in Chapter Two and
in this chapter that the CAB's role in commercial helicopter passenger
service development was that of promotion. With the Congress'
Declaration cf Policy as its mandate and the legal authority of
Section 406, Title IV, of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the CAB
made a sustained effort to support the helicopter industry. Through
substantial ennual subsidies from 1947 to 1965, it was hoped that
commercial service could be kept active until an economical helicopter
of sufficient capacity would come on the market to make the service
self -supportive and profitable.
Table 17 reveals the total annual revenues and the total annual
subsidy the helicopter group received since 1954 and the percentage the
subsidy was of total revenues.
The twelve -year period recorded in Table 17 shows a gradual
decline in the percentage of subsidies to total overall revenues. In
the later years this was due to a combination of increasing total over-





The total subsidy granted the helicopter group amounted to $49,867,000
over the twelve years, and this was 57.6 percent of total overall
revenues in that time span.
TABLE 17




































aTotal Subsidy does not include service mail pay.
Source: CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics .
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The anti -helicopter subsidy movement began in the House
Appropriations Committee's Independent Offices Subcommittee under the
leadership of Rep. Albert Thomas (D -Texas) in June, 1961, when the
Fiscal Year 1962 budget was before the Congress. For four years a
battle for the subsidy funds was waged by CAB Chairman Alan S. Boyd,
who found it increasingly difficult to receive what he requested.
After fifteen years of granting subsidies, which culminated in
the highest annual subsidy of $5,667,000 in 1961, there was some fear
in the House that the subsidy would continue indefinitely. In that
year, the House began curtailing funds with the goal of eliminating the
subsidy entirely in Fiscal Year 1963. It was recommended by the House
that the subsidy be limited to five million dollars in Fiscal Year 1962
and eliminate the subsidy in Fiscal Year 1963. The CAB chairman went
to the other extreme, stating that helicopter subsidy needs would "peak
out" at eight million dollars in Fiscal Yaar 1963 and decline to five
million by 1966. 1
Chairman Boyd had a more receptive ear in the Senate, as was to
be the case in the following years. The argument that subsidy reductions
would prevent breakthroughs in helicopter development, especially since
the helicopter airlines were in the process of just receiving twin-
engine turbines that promised more economic performance, was readily
understood by that legislative body. V/ithout funds to get the airlines
through the expected initial high cost phase of their introduction, the
fifteen year experiment in helicopter transportation would fail just
before it had the first possibility that it would succeed. The Senate
"Helicopter Lines Face Pressure on Subsidy," Aviation Week ,
June 19, 1961, p. 41.
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restored a substantial portion of the subsidy amount cut by the House
that year, but it was clear that subsidies would continue to be cut
annually .* The CAB recommended to the three carriers that they curtail
some services to operate within the reduced subsidy ceiling. CHA dis-
continued its mail service and LAA and NYA curtailed proposed route
2
expansion.
The same situation developed in 1962 and 1963. The House would
drastically cut the subsidy and the Senate would restore a portion of
the cut, but a little less each time.
In 1964 the battle over subsidies between the Congress and the
CAB prompted talk of holding public hearings in the Senate on the subject.
After the Seriate compromised with the House on a $3.5 million subsidy
ceiling for I'iscal Year 1965 --down from the $4.3 million that the CAB
felt was the absolute minimum --efforts were begun to hold hearings in
the current fiscal year (1965) with the intent of ". . . establishing
a firm national policy on subsidized helicopter operations, with clear-
cut guidelines indicating how many such operators are needed and what
the anticipated subsidy cost may be over a span of years."
The CAB had long been criticized by the House members who were
looking for an economy issue because of its firm support of the helicopter
^•"Helicopter Lines Claim Subsidy Cut Would Bar VTOL Breakthroughs,"
Aviation Week , July 3, 1961, p. 36.
2Glenn Garrison, "NY Airways 107 Fleet Keyed to Subsidy,"
Aviation Week , October 30, 1961, p. 36.
Senate Backs Helicopter Subsidies," Aviation Week , November 4,
1963, p. 43.
James R. Ashlock, "Expansion Seen Saving Helicopter Service,"
Aviation Week . August 24, 1964, pp. 34-35.




airlines. It was argued that these three certified airlines should be
receiving subsidies from the localities they served and not the federal
government. Because their operations were essentially intrastate
(except for NYA service to Newark) or, more accurately, intracity; foes
in Congress felt they should be no more federally subsidized than taxi-
cabs and city bus lines. Yet, in the past, the CAB could not expand
the helicopter service to other metropolitan areas to gain the support
of House members because the subsidy need would have been prohibitive.
There were an estimated eighty applications to provide helicopter
service at one time, but pressure to limit and reduce subsidy payments,
both from the CAB's staff level and the Congress, prevented any action
on them. A factor that made the CAB all the more uncomfortable in
front of Congress was the initial success of the non-subsidized SFO
p
Airline.
Despite the House warning in the Fiscal 1965 appropriation
that the Hou-.se did not want to see a Fisoal 1966 budget request for a
helicopter subsidy, Chairman Boyd insisted on submitting a Fiscal Year
1966 budget request, incurring the wrath of some in Congress who did
not support the helicopter airlines. His basis for prosecuting the
case was Section 406 which required him to support the helicopter
airlines as he did the local airlines. This was in direct conflict
with the uncertain intent of Congress who must appropriate subsidy
funds to the CAB to carry out its responsibilities under Section 406.
If under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 the CAB was required to set
a compensation rate for mail carriage on the one hand, and the Congress
Ashlock, "Expansion Seen Saving Helicopter," p. 34.
2
"Senate Probe Due," p. 34.
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did not appropriate funds to cover that rate on the other, the CAB felt
that the federal government would be open to prosecution by the heli-
copter airlines for failure to honor their legal claims.
In November, 1964, the CAB began a two -phase campaign to sell
the Budget Bureau, then the Congress, on a $13.5 million, five-year
plan under which subsidy to the three helicopter airlines would be
decreased from $4.2 million in Fiscal 1966 to $1.1 million in Fiscal
p
1970, and ending subsidies after that year.
Public hearings began on March 8, 1965, and continued through
the 11th. Interested and affected organizations were given the
opportunity to voice their opinions on the subject before Senate
Aviation Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce chaired by Senator
A. S. Mike Monroney (D-Okla.), a sympathetic supporter of the helicopter
industry. Federal Aviation Agency Administrator N. E. Halaby repre-
sented President Lyndon Johnson's view that the subsidy should end
because it benefited only a few people. Senator William Proxmire
(D-Wis.) called the helicopter subsidy an "example of a thrill we have
in all our federal programs."
Senator Robert Kennedy (D-N.Y.) pressed for the subsidy, as
did all four presidents of the helicopter airlines, the affected com-




"CAB Helicopter Subsidy Campaign," Aviation Meek , November 30,
1964, p. 29.
3
"Trunlclines May Discuss Methods to Ease Helicopter Lines'





Testimony of the hearings was recorded, as usual, and is
available from the Commerce Committee or the CAB library. Entitled
the Helicopter Air Service Program , this reference was utilized
extensively in Chapter II. Because of the length and detail, a full
discussion of the pros and cons of the subsidy continuance would not
be appropriate here.
The hearings served only to publicize the views of the various
opponents and proponents of the subsidy question. No legislation
resulted from them, and the question of who has the power to grant
subsidy funds, the Congress or the CAB, remained unresolved. Eventual
airline support of the helioopter airlines sidestepped that question,
allowing the CAB to eliminate the subsidy.
Two events took place in 1965 that drew the curtain on further
helicopter subsidies. By April 12, 1965, the CAB's funds that were
designated for the helicopter operators in the Fiscal 1965 appropriation
were exhausted. Because the CAB was not authorized to transfer funds
for helicopter subsidy from any other source, a request for a supple-
mental appropriation of $942,000 to cover the months of April, May, and
2
June, 1965, was made.
This deficiency was caused by the Congress in 1964 when it cut
nearly $1 million from the CAB's $4.3 million helicopter subsidy request,
even though the CAB had issued a rate order obligating itself for the
larger amount. Throughout Fiscal 1965, payments to the carriers were
Harold D. Vatkins, "Airlines to Meet Again on Helicopter Aid,"
Aviation Week
,
May 10, 1965, p. 43.
Tlicherd G. O'Lone, "Helicopter Carriers Facing Early Crisis,"
Aviation Week, April 12, 1965, p. 47.
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made based on this rate order and this led to the exhausted funds.
The House refused to accept the $942,000 additional supplemental
appropriation which was added to a House-passed supplemental appropria-
tions bill by the Senate. Following this House vote, the Senate with
only a handful of members present then agreed to leave the subsidy out
of the final bill. As envisioned by Chairman Boyd, the three heli-
copter carriers brought suit in the United States Court of Claims and
recovered from the government the $942,000 due them.
Despite the efforts of the House Appropriations Committee,
following the recommendations of Rep. Albert Thomas' Independent Offices
Subcommittee to cut the $2.1 million requested in the Fiscal 1966 budget
for helicopter subsidies, the Congress provided a limited appropriation
5for the helicopter operators with a cut-off date of December 31, 1965.
The subsidization of the helicopter carriers by the federal government
had come to an end.
Summary
Originally economic regulation of the air transportation
industry began with the Post Office Department. Irregularities in the
awarding of air mail contracts in those years prompted the enactment of
the Air Mail Act of 1934 v/hich made the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the Bureau of Air Commerce, and the Post Office Department responsible
1
Ibid.
Catkins, "Airlines to Meet Again," p. 42.
3CAB, "Major Board Actions," Handbook , p. 469.
Catkins, "Airlines to Meet Again," p. 42.
5CAB, "Major Board Actions," Handbook , p. 469.
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for the control of civil aviation. The Post Office Department still
retained control over entry into the air industry through its awarding
of air mail contracts.
However, it was soon apparent that three agencies could not
effectively manage the industry. At the recommendation of a policy
committee, responsibility for civil aviation was assigned to one federal
body. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1934 established the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority to control civil aviation. In 1940 President Roosevelt,
by executive order, divided the Civil Aeronautics Authority into the
Civil Aeronautics Administration, which was responsible for safety and
administrative procedures in civil aviation; and the Civil Aeronautics
Board, which was responsible for the economic regulation of civil avia-
tion much like the Post Office Department had been in earlier years.
In 1958 the Federal Aviation Act '/as passed. It created the
Federal Aviation Agency which replaced the Civil Aviation Administration
and its functions. At the same time, it reconfirmed the Civil Aero-
nautics Board's role as an independent, economic regulator of civil
aviation.
The CAB, under the mandate handed down by the Congress in the
form of a Declaration of Policy and under the power granted by Titles IV
and X of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1934, was quick to promote heli-
copter service following World War II. Section 406(a) allowed the CAB
to fix mail rates; Section 406(c) stated that the Post Office Depart-
ment should pay the helicopter carriers for the delivery of mail; and
Section 406(b) stipulated that the remainder of the total mail compen-
sation (the subsidy portion) would be paid by the CAB out of appropria-
tions from Congress in order to promote air transportation.
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With this authority the CAB continued to provide subsidies to
the three certified helicopter carriers from 1947 until 1965 in an
effort to maintain helicopter service until that industry could become
self sufficient. However, the increasing deficits in the national
budget prompted the Congress in 1960 to begin a program of gradual
elimination of aviation subsidies. By 1965 when subsidies were dropped,
the CAB had provided approximately fifty million dollars to the heli-
copter carriers which represented 57.6 percent of the total overall
revenues acquired by the carriers since 1954.
Pressure for the subsidy cutoff originated in the House Appro-
priations Committee 's Independent Offices Subcommittee in June 1961.
It received support from the House body, but the Senate Commerce
Committee's Aviation Subcommittee successfully fought drastic reductions
in subsidies until 1965, At that time pressure from the Senate, the
President of the United States, and federal aviation officials (except
Chairman Boyd of the CAB) succeeded in vetoing further subsidies. An
influential factor in the defeat of further annual subsidies until 1970
was essentially the relatively small areas which the helicopter carriers
serviced. Lacking the broad support that the regional air carriers
experienced, it became difficult to justify public funds for services
that benefited only three metropolitan areas in the country.

CHAPTER V
THE COMMERCIAL AIRLINES 1 ROLE
Introduction
A discussion of helicopter service in the United States would
not be complete without citing the important role of the large commercial
airlines in its development. Perhaps the word "development" is not
appropriate, because the airlines did not begin to take a truly active
role in helicopter service until the mid-1960's. Nevertheless, the
airlines' participation spelled the difference between a helicopter
airline's continued operation and closure.
Because of the late active appearence of the large airlines,
relative to the helicopter airlines' passenger-carrying history, it
would be best to divide our study into two periods. In this way the
degree of support given the helicopter airlines by the trunklines will
be readily seen. The first period will be labeled pre-1965, and the
second period will be labeled post -1965.
Pre-1965
The first twelve years of commercial helicopter passenger
service found the large commercial airlines treating the helicopter
airlines as equals in the transportation field. Their attitude was not
one of benevolent paternalism, but one of "strictly business" without




its own merits, and what assistance the fixed-wing airlines provided was
of mutual benefit to both.
The trunkline's role in support of helicopter service was that
of providing passengers to the helicopter airlines while, at the same
time, the latter was providing passengers to the trunks. This was
accomplished in three ways: promotion of helicopter service through
local, long-haul fixed-wing airlines and travel agent advertising;^
helicopter airline use of trunkline facilities such as NYA's use of
American Airlines 1 gate and other operational facilities without charge
or LAA's use of United Airlines* baggage transfer mechanism and other
facilities at favorable rental rates; 3 and joint fare agreements. The
joint fare agreement was the most substantial contribution by the
trunklines in this period, and it therefore deserves considerably more
attention.
The joint fare agreement was one of many such agreements that
all airlines participated in. These airline-wide agreements, known as
"interline" services, made it possible for a helicopter airline passenger
to be ticketed jointly on a helicopter airline and any of the world's
scheduled airlines, and to have his baggage checked through to his
4destination on a single interline baggage check. This eliminated the
inconvenience of having to purchase two tickets—one for the helicopter
flight, and the other for the fixed-wing flight—and having to carry his
Gregory , "Los Angeles Airways Expands," p. 45.
Htfew York Airways, 1964 Annual Report .









baggage from one aircraft to another himself.
NYA instituted the first of the helicopter fixed-wing joint
fares in 1955 with Northwest Airlines. Under a joint fare, a passenger
receives helicopter transportation as part of a fixed-wing journey for
less (or for free) than the sum of the fixed-wing and helicopter fares
if these were purohased separately. ^ That is, if a passenger traveling
from Newark Airport to the Los Angeles Airport via the John F. Kennedy
International Airport purchased, first, a ticket for the helicopter
flight from Newark to John F. Kennedy, and then a separate ticket from
John F. Kennedy to Los Angeles, he would be paying more than the joint
fare price which allows a reduction to the passenger. This reduction
is absorbed by both the fixed-wing carrier and the helicopter airline
at some specified rate established by a voluntary bilateral arrangement
between the two carriers. Because of this situation, each joint fare
agreement must be a good business proposition.
There are three primary reasons for entering into a joint fare
agreement. All are designed to attract more passengers, thus increasing
operating revenues for both carriers. The first reason is due to com-
petition. A fixed-wing airline is willing to establish a reduced rate
to the customer in the form of a joint fare in order to provide better
service and, at the same time, increase their business. Competition
also prompts a carrier to establish a joint fare if a competing airline
has done so. A second reason might be because of a lack of operating
lnEight Airlines Sign Pact with NYA," Aviation Week , October 31,
1955, p. 86.
o









space at one airport, and joint fares with a helicopter operator
enables the fixed -wing airline to offer service to the public through
both airports while only serving one. An example would be the NYA-
Northwest agreement in 1955. Northwest was serving John F. Kennedy,
but not Newark Airport. Because they wanted to serve people flying
into Newark, they entered into a joint fare agreement with NYA to
provide free transportation from Newark to John F. Kennedy for its
customers. The third reason is similar to the second, but it differs
in that a trunk airline decides to stay out of an airport rather than
the lack of space preventing him from moving in.
The absorption rate of the reduced amount of fare is usually
dependent on the fixed -wing carrier's fare which is based on the distance
of its flight. Table 18 provides a typical example of how joint fares
are absorbed. SFO's joint fare arrangement is similar to CHA's the
latter of which is displayed in the table. Only the lowest and highest
category of ^he trunkline fare range is given to provide an understanding
of the mechanics of joint fares.
Post-1965
The March, 1965, hearings before Senate's Aviation Subcommittee
was the turning point in the fixed-wing carriers' attitude of mutual
benefit arrangements with the helicopter airlines. Under the four-year
long pressure being applied by the House Appropriations Committee to
cease providing funds to subsidize the helicopter carriers, the Senate
began a movement to convince the trunk airlines that they should assume
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Stuart G. Tipton, the president of the Air Transport Association,
disagreed with Senator A. S. Mike Monroney, chairman of the Subcommittee,
on the grounds that the airlines were already "... giving the heli-
copters about $1 million a year in interline business
. . . which was as
far as the airlines should go or be expected to go."** On this first day
of the hearings, he stressed that:
The Congress has set out to develop a regularly scheduled
helicopter service as a common carrier tool available to the
general public, not just to airline passengers. Expecting the
airlines to pick up the remaining subsidy would in my opinion
destroy the value of the experiment. Inevitably helicopter
service would then be developed solely as an adjunct to airline
schedules . . , 3
Sensing that he had hit a sensitive area ty his interpretation of inter-
line agreements as trunkline support of the helicopter lines and by his
adamant stand on further airline support, Stuart Tipton reversed himself
on March 11, 1965, the fourth and final day of the hearings, by
emphasizing the airlines 1 willingness to cooperate with the federal
government in keeping helicopter service alive. -*
In response to this appeal for helicopter assistance in light of
the House's avowed promise to end subsidies in 1965, the trunk airlines
agreed to launch an industry-wide promotional campaign to stimulate
patronage on the four certificated helicopter carriers. Point-of-sale
^"Trunks Balk at Aiding Helicopter Carriers," Aviation Week ,
March 15, 1965, p. 291.
%bid .







displays, brochures, and helicopter schedules in each trunkline carrier's
schedule leaflet were some of the promotional techniques exercised by
the individual airlines in addition to the industry -v/ide campaign. 1
Delta Airlines arranged a more liberal joint fare agreement
with three helicopter operators. It called for a Delta passenger to
pay one-half of the regular fare for helicopter tickets, with Delta
making up all of the difference. In earlier joint fare arrangements,
p
the helicopter operator had to absorb some of the reduction.
From May, 1965, on, Trans -World Airlines (TV/A) and Pan American
World Airways (PAA) began a series of operating and financial support
agreements- with NYA and SFO. Initially designed as interim agreements
until the subsidy question was resolved in 1965, they eventually replaced
the federal subsidies long granted to the helicopter carriers.
On May 24, 1965, SFO asked the CAB to approve an agreement with
TWA in which the latter airline would guarantee the breakeven expense
of round trip service between TWA's ramp area at San Francisco Inter-
national Airport and the Santa Clara County points of Sunnyvale and Palo
Alto. 3
The first large direct financial support offered on June 7,
1965, by the large fixed -wing carriers was PAA's and TWA's planned loan
to NYA of $995,000 and a plan to underwrite virtually all of the heli-
copter carrier's flight hours for a certain unspecified length of time.
Harold D. Watkins, "Congressional Debate Endangers Subsidized
Helicopter Operations," Aviation Week , May 3, 1965, p. 29.
%bid.
^"Scheduled Helicopters Continuing Operations," Aviation Week ,
May 31, 1965, p. 26; and CAB, Docket 16180.
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In addition, PAA offered to purchase a third Boeing V-107 ordered by
NYA earlier and to return NYA's down payment on the aircraft to reduce
that airline's bank loan. This helicopter, plus two other V-107 's
ordered by PAA itself, would be leased to NYA by PAA.
The agreement was so drawn that neither TWA or PAA would be
able to dominate the affairs of NYA. Recovery of the two airlines*
full investment was not explicitly promised. The payments covered the
difference between revenues and expenses, plus an eight percent return
to NYA, on the particular routes each airline supported. In general,
TWA supported flight operations between the Wall Street Heliport,
Manhattan,, and Newark, LaGuardia and Kennedy airports. PAA's route was
between the Pan Am rooftop heliport and the John F. Kennedy Airport.
The GAB tentatively approved the PAA-TWA plan until a formal
study could be made. The regulating agency was faced with a situation
that clearly violated Sections 408 and 409 of the Civil Aeronautics Act
relating to interlocking relationships and air carrier agreements,
respectively. But with the Congressional withdrawal of federal sub-
sidies, there appeared to be little choice but to circumvent the law.
Either some measure of relief had to be provided or NYA would close
down. They were reluctant, but the urgency of the situation required
immediate aid. 3 The final decision on the PAA-TWA plan for NYA was
approved in part on May 20, 1966.
1
"Pan American, TWA Agree to Aid NY Airways in Survival Effort,"
Aviation Week , June 21, I960, p. 34.
2
"CAB Cool to Airline Aid for NY Airways," Aviation Week ,
July 5, 1965, p. 28.
3Ibid.
4CAB, Docket 16216, Order No. E-23704.
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In December, 1965, the CAB established conditions which should
apply vhen helicopter airlines received financial assistance from fixed,
wing carriers. These conditions applied to LAA, SFO, and CHA, as well
as other trunklines where applicable, even though NYA, PAA, and TWA
were mentioned specifically. The conditions were:
1) NYA scheduling practices must not be influenced in any
manner by either PAA or TWA;
2) There must be no restrictions on the use of any aircraft
purchased;
3) All operations must be conducted for the general benefit
of the traveling public with no preferential treatment extended
to any particular segment;
4) The display by NYA of any markings other than its own
must be prohibited;
5) There should be no restrictive conditions which would
prevent NYA from negotiating similar arrangements with any other
carrier; and
6) There must be no restrictions or impediments on NYA
operations from the Pan Am building heliport. •*-
Another example of the type of support the trunklines began to
give the helicopter airlines took place in June, 1966. American Air-
lines (AA) and Trans -World Airlines (TWA) agreed to underwrite costs on
all seventy -four daily flights of SFO up to its previously highest cost
per month and guarantee an additional $9,000 per month. Under a two-
year agreement, TWA underwrote costs on forty -nine flights a day to San
Francisco Bey area airports up to an average cost of $535,000 per month
in a given year. AA underwrote costs on twenty-five flights per day up
to an average cost of $275,000 a month. AA would pay the additional




$9,000 per month. 1
Additional support was provided by both trunklines when TWA and
AA guaranteed $1 million and $500,000, respectively, borrowed by SFO
from the Bank of America. In return for the guarantees, AA and TWA
were given stock warrants for 37,500 and 75,000 common shares,
o
respectively.
One more example of financial assistance was a joint loan
agreement by AA and United Airlines for $3.2 million approved by the
CAB on February 17, 1966. Payment of interest on the five percent
subordinated convertible income notes was contingent on earnings sub-
sequent to December 31, 1965.
Of all the helicopter airlines, NYA had the most extensive
operating and support agreements. A final example of each is provided
to show the amount of support they received from the large fixed-wing
airlines.
On August 27, 1969, NYA entered into an Operating Agreement
with PAA, effective upon recommencement of proposed service from the
Pan Am building heliport. Under the terms of that agreement, PAA
would share the company's costs and revenues from annual support
payments to NYA of up to $260,000, should the service operate at a
specified deficit, to payments from NYA not to exceed $481,000 a year
"''CAB, Docket 18011, Order No. E-24800.
jTrank J. St. Clair, ed., Moody's Transportation Manual 1966
(New York: Robert H. Messner, Publisher, 1966), p. 1043.
^Frank J. St. Clair, ed., Moody 's Transportation Manual 196 8
(New York: Robert H. Messner, Publisher, 1968), p. 1385.
A disagreement between PAA and NYA over financial support of
NYA closed the heliport on February 15, 1968. "Wall Street Helicopter
Service is Assured," Aviation Week , March 11, 1968, p. 33.
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in the event revenues exceed related expenses.
In a Financing Agreement with PAA, on August 27, 1969, NYA sold
284,991 shares of capital stock at $3.50 per share to PAA in 1969. In
addition, NYA granted options to PAA to purchase 245,160 more shares at
the same price. In the event that PAA exercised this option and it
resulted in PAA's holdings in NYA exceeding forty -five percent of the
total voting capital shares issued and outstanding, the excess stock
would be exercisable in Class B, non-voting, capital stock. This was
in keeping with the CAB's conditions of air carrrier agreements laid
down in 1965.
An equipment agreement on January 23, 1970, subleased four
Sikorsky S-61L helicopters to NYA by PAA. The agreement included spare
engines and parts, along with the responsibility for maintenance being
shouldered by NYA. 3
A Support Agreement on February 6, 1969, provided for intensified
traffic support and promotional efforts by American Airlines (AA) for
NYA services to and from the Lower Manhattan heliport and the three area
airports. Among other things, this agreement provides that AA will make
available to NYA ramp space and gate facilities at Newark, LaGuardia,
and John F. Kennedy airports without cost. Also, AA will furnish a
complete passenger reservation service in NYA's name. AA will absorb
forty percent or more of NYA's one-way fares for passengers using those
American flights originating or terminating in long distance flights.
George H. Parsons, ed., Moody's Transportation Manual 1970





The AA agreement is a ten-year agreement and it does not prevent NYA
from operating flights from terminal areas of other airlines. 1
With these sample agreements, it is readily apparent that the
degree of fixed-wing airline interest in helicopter carriers increased
tremendously from the pre -1965 period. And there can be no doubt that
the federal government applied generous amounts of pressure on the
airline industry to fill the subsidy void with their own revenues.
Summary
The trunk airlines' role in supporting scheduled helicopter
operations can be divided into two periods: "pre-1965" and "post-1965."
In the early period trunk lines treated the helicopter carriers
as equals in the aviation transportation industry. Favorable terms
were granted only if the result would provide more revenue passengers
to the trunk lines. In this period, trunkline support manifested itself
in promotion of helicopter service by the local, long-haul, fixed-wing
airlines; helicopter carrier use of trunkline facilities; and the use
of joint fare agreements.
The joint fare agreement was by far the most prominent support
given by the trunklines in this early stage. Under the joint fare, a
passenger received helicopter transportation as part of a fixed-wing
journey for less (or for free) than the sum of the fixed wing and
helicopter fares if these were purchased separately.
The post-1965 period marks the end of subsidy payments to the
helicopter carriers and the beginning of a more benevolent attitude on




action was prompted by the Congress who applied pressure to the airline
industry to provide more direct support to the helicopter carriers
since they would directly benefit from such support. The airline
industry somewhat reluctantly agreed to replace the government's subsidy
role. This took the form of helicopter promotion, more liberal joint
fare agreements, the guaranteeing of breakeven expense on selected
route segments of the helicopter carriers, financial support in the
form of loans and the underwriting of a carrier's flight hours for a
certain length of time, the guaranteeing of bank loans, equipment
agreements which provided for the subleasing of helicopters and parts,
and support agreements which provided more facilities for helicopter
operations.
Clearly, Sections 403 and 409 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 which prohibited interlocking relationships and air carrier agree-
ments were being violated with this trunkline support. But with federal,
subsidies cut off, the urgency of the situation required that some
relief be provided. Certain conditions were imposed by the CAB on the





The commercial helicopter passenger transportation industry as
represented by the four certificated helicopter carriers—Los Angeles
Airways, Chicago Helicopter Airways, New York Airways, and San
Francisco -Oakland Airlines—has not performed well economically but has
provided a valuable service to those passengers willing to pay for its
expensive service.
In providing a valuable service, we have only to look at the
crowded highways and streets in the metropolitan areas served by the
four carriers. In the New York and San Francisco areas, this problem
is compounded by the natural water barriers. The helicopter carriers
played an important role in overcoming those man-made and natural barriers
by providing a time saving service to those people who considered time
valuable, whether it was for business or pleasure. This service of
convenience and necessity, so aptly put by the CAB on its certification
titles, was particularly apparent where passengers arriving at one
airport had to connect with a scheduled flight at another airport. A
passenger in such a situation had one of three alternatives to choose
from: 1) a long layover that would allow a low cost, leisurely bus trip
to the other airport; 2) attempt to make the connection as fast as
possible by cab, but enduring the traffic and paying a higher fare; or




missed connection by utilizing the helicopter service. An increasing
number annually chose the helicopter service up until 1967. It was no
coincidence that SFO's, NYA's, and CHA's most heavily traveled routes
were between airports.
But in light of this apparent valuable service offered by the
helicopter, a very important question should be asked: do the benefits
justify the cost? The facts say no, for a number of reasons.
The highest number of annual passenger originations for the
helicopter carriers occurred in 1966, 1967, and 1968. In 1968, that
number v/as 1,041,000 scheduled passenger originations. In that same
year, the total number of originating and terminating passengers
utilizing scheduled domestic airline service in New York, San Francisco,
Chicago, and Los Angeles totaled 55,332,000 passengers. That means
that only approximately 1.9 percent of those 55,332,000 utilized heli-
copter service in those cities.
In 1968 total operating costs of the four carriers totaled
approximately $16,177,000 which exceeded transportation revenue by
approximately $5,609,000. Should a service be continually provided that
loses that much money to carry only 1.9 percent of the total potential
passengers it could carry?
This situation has been repeated annually by the carriers since
the commencement of their service. There was not one year in the heli-
copter passenger transportation industry history that they did not lose
less than approximately $4,091,000. The most profitable helicopter
airline in the industry in terms of transportation revenue versus total
lcAB
» Handbook of Airline Statistics 1963 , p. 387.
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operating costs was SFO Airlines. Its most "profitable" year was 1964
vhen it lost approximately $157,000!
The primary reason for these tremendous annual losses is the
high cost of operating a helicopter. A measure of this cost in relation
to revenues can be seen when it is based on a per passenger mile
standard. The annual average revenue yield per passenger mile in the
period from 1957 to 1968 was thirty-five cents but the operating cost
was eighty -seven cents per passenger mile. Another measure of operating
costs is based on a per available ton -mile measured in dollars. This
has gradually declined from $6.75 in 1953 to $2.64 in 1968. But when
the last figure is compared to fixed-wing aircraft operation, there is
a startling contrast. In 1963, 1965, and 1967, local service carrier
costs per available ton-mile were .475, .460, and .398 cents, respec-
tively.
There are two ways to overcome this high cost of operation. A
more economical helicopter could be produced, and/or the revenue
passenger load factor could be increased. The former is not likely in
the very near future because of the declining business in the helicopter
manufacturing industry creating a lack of money for research and
development; and because the market for commercial passenger helicopters
is too small to justify the expense. Consequently, the latter method of
improved revenue yields per passenger mile must be approached. But this
means that load factors must be increased from an average of 41.7 percent
from 1953 to 1970. This average has been decreasing since 1966, along




Having established the costs of operation, one must ask why the
CAB continued to subsidize the commercial helicopter passenger trans-
portation industry from 1947 to 1965 until prodded by the Congress to
end the subsidies? In the early years, there can be no doubt that the
CAB was justified in supporting the commercial helicopter industry
because of its newness in aviation and the lack of operational data to
evaluate its potential. But one wonders why that organization continued
to subsidize the carriers on the basis of the antiquated mail statutes
in the Civil Aeronautics Act when passenger service constituted the
bulk of the carriers* revenues and the emphasis was on passenger service.
This state of affairs cost the government approximately $49,867,000 in
subsidies (not including the mail pay to pay for what little mail was
carried) from 1954 to 1965. This amounted to 57.6 percent of the
industries' total overall revenues.
It was no wonder that the Congress had its way in reducing the
subsidies. For all the federal funds provided to make the helicopter
industry self-sufficient, the industry still continued to lose money
annually at a fairly consistent rate.
By 1965 the Congress --a national body--could not justify
supporting the helicopter carriers—a locally -oriented organization—any
longer. There was no longer any justification for supporting the
carriers on the grounds of ". . . present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense" as stated in the CAB's Declaration
of Policy. Domestic and foreign needs were being met by less expensive
transportation systems. The postal service was no longer a big user of
the helicopter. And the military had established a substantial
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helicopter inventory and developed sufficient cost data and expertise
that reliance on commercial operators for such information was reduced
if not eliminated. The Congress was justified in cutting off the sub-
sidies on this basis.
The trunk airline industry's replacement of the federal govern-
ment in the role of grand subsidizer v/as a temporary relief to the
helicopter industry. It was temporary in that eventual shutdown for
some was only postponed a while longer. All the joint fares, promotional
schemes, loans, stock purchases, and underwritings seem to ignore the
fact that a more economical helicopter was needed to perform the intra -
city and inter-airport transportation service. This is apparent when
you compare the transportation revenue and operating cost figures.
From 1966 through 1968, except for NYA, the losses increased each year.
The primary recommendation is very obvious at this point. Some
way must be found to manufacture a helicopter whose costs of operation
are comparable to competing types of aircraft and conducive to making
a profit. The costs per available seat-mile are still too high.
Until costs of operation are brought dov/n, ways of increasing
the overall load factor must be uncovered. A step in the right
direction would be a concerted effort on the part of aviation promoters
and influential citizens to locate downtown heliports in places con-
venient to the users of helicopter services. In all cases, except the
Pan Am building in New York, presently established downtown heliports
were located at remote sites in the interests of safety rather than
convenience for potential customers. Safety should not be compromised,
but neither should convenience when the safety of helicopter operations
has long been established.
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Finally, larger capacity helicopters are not the answer to
reducing costs in the intra -city and inter-airport market. Load
factors are low with the present capacity. To increase the load





Type: 4-seat general utility helicopter.
Rotors: 3 -blade main rotor and tail rotor.
Power plant: One 450 hp Pratt and Whitney R-985 Wasp, Jr. nine-cylinder
radial, fan-cooled engine.
Fuel capacity: One tank forward of engine with a capacity of 100 gallons
and one aft of engine with a capacity of eight gallons.
Accommodation: Enclosed cabin seating four (pilot centrally in front
and three passengers on a cross bench aft)
.
Dimensions: Main rotor diameter 48 ft.
Tail rotor diameter
Length overall
Weights : Weight empty
Disposable load
Weight loaded
Performance: Maximum speed at sea level
Maximum economical cruising speed
Maximum rate of climb at sea level
Range
8 ft. 5 in.






1200 ft. per min.
260 miles
Source: Leonard Bridgman, ed., Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1949-






Type: 12-seat general utility helicopter.
Rotors: 3-blade main rotor and 2-blade tail rotor.
Power plant: One R-1300-3 Wright radial air cooled engine rated at
700 hp.
Fuel capacity: One 185-gallon tank.
Accommodation: Pilot's compartment contains pilot and co-pilot sitting
side by side with flight controls for each. Cabin is located
aft and below the pilot's compartment and it has a capacity
of seven passengers.








Maximum speed at sea level
Cruising speed
Maximum rate of climb at sea level
Range (with reserve)
8 ft. 9 in.






1020 ft. per min.
360 miles
Source: Leonard Bridgman, ed., Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1959-





Type: 12-18 seat commercial passenger helicopter.
Rotors: 4-blade main rotor and tail rotor.
Power plant: One Wright R-1820-84 radial air-cooled engine rated at
1525 hp.
Fuel capacity: One tank with a fuel capacity range from 198 to 307
gallons depending on the model.
Accommodation: Flight and cabin compartments similar to S-55. Cabin
has a capacity of 12 to 18 passengers depending on model.








8 ft. 9 in.




Cruising speed at sea level 101 mph
Maximum rate of climb at sea level 1000 ft. per min,
Range (with reserve) 190 miles




Type: 15-seat commercial passenger transport.
Rotors: Two 3-blede main rotors located forward and aft in a tandem
configuration.
Power plant: One Wright Cyclone 977C9 HD1 nine-cylinder radial air-
cooled engine rated at 1425 hp.
Accommodation: Crew of two sitting side by side with dual controls in
forward compartment. Cabin has capacity for fifteen passengers,







Maximum speed at sea level
Cruising speed
Maximum rate ofclimb at sea level
Range (with reserve)














Type: 8 to 11-seat utility helioopter
Rotor: 5-blade main rotor and 2-blade tail rotor
Power plant: 105O shaft horsepower (shp) General Electric T-58-6
shaft turbine.
Fuel capacity: 182 gallons
Accommodation: Pilot's compartment like S-55 and S-58. Cabin capacity
is eight to eleven passengers.








8 ft. 9 in.




Maximum speed at sea level 124 mph
Cruising speed 115 mph
Maximum rate of climb at sea level 1380 ft. per min.
Notes: 1) The S-62 used some S-55 components such as the main and tail
rotor blades and heads, main and intermediate gearboxes, shafting, tail
rotor pylon, and portions of the flight controls and hydraulic systems.
2) The S-62 was designed from the start for amphibious operations,
The bottom of the fuselage was watertight and strengthened to permit
landings on either water or snow. Two outrigger floats containing
partially retractable gear were designed to resist rolling during
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touchdown or while on vater.
3) The S-62 could carry 630 lbs. more than the S-55, but
weighed 350 lbs. less because of the lighter weight of the turbine
engine.




Type: Twin-turbine all-weather helicopter airliner.
Rotor: 5 -blade main and tail rotor.
Power plant: Two 1250 shp General Electric CT-58-110-1 shaft turbine
engines.
Fuel capacity: Forward tank contains 210 gallons and aft tank contains
200 gallons.
Accommodations: Flight compartment like the S-55. Cabin in S-61L
contained twenty-eight passengers and S-61N contained twenty-six,










10 ft. 4 in.
72 ft. 7 in.







Performance: Maximum speed at sea level 150 mph
Average cruising speed 140 mph
Maximum rate of climb at sea level 1300 ft. per min.
Range (with 30 min. reserve) 275 miles
Note: The S-61L model was a non -amphibious version while the S-61N was
amphibious with a sealed hull and stabilizing floats, like the S-62.
Source: John W. R. Taylor, ed., Jane's All the World's Aircraft




Type: Twin-engine, tandem commercial transport helicopter.
Rotor: Two 3-blade main rotors in tandem.
Pov/er plant: Two 1250 shp General Electric CT-58-110-1 shaft turbine
engines mounted side by side at the base of the aft rotor pylon.
Fuel capacity: Two fuel tanks, one located in each sponsoon.
Capacity is 350 gallons.
Accommodation: Flight compartment like the V44. Cabin contained
twenty -five passengers.







Maximum speed at sea level
Average cruising speed
Maximum rate of climb at sea level
Range (with reserve)
50 ft.
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